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ABSTRACT
Solar PV Adoption in the United States:
An Empirical Investigation of State Policy Effectiveness
February 2015
Ilya Chernyakhovskiy, B.S., University of Massachusetts Amherst
M.S., University of Massachusetts Amherst
Directed by: Professor Christine L. Crago
State policy incentives for solar power have grown significantly in the past several
years. This paper examines the effectiveness of policy incentives to increase residen-
tial solar PV capacity. County-level solar adoption data and controls for demographic
characteristics, solar resources, and pro-environmental preferences are used to esti-
mate a model of residential solar adoption. Empirical findings show that financial in-
centives, solar-specific mandates, and loan financing programs are important drivers
of residential PV capacity growth. Incentives that reduce the up-front cost of adop-
tion and that are subject to low uncertainty are found to have the largest impact.
Results also point to a significant positive relationship between hybrid vehicle sales
and residential PV capacity growth, indicating the importance of pro-environmental
preference as a predictor of solar PV demand.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Renewable energy has received growing support in the past several years due to
concerns about climate change and energy security. Solar energy is one of the most
promising sources of renewable energy (RE). It is widely abundant and produces
less greenhouse gas emissions relative to energy sources from fossil fuel. According
to Lopez et al. (2012), customer-cited rooftop solar PV has the technical potential
to supply roughly 20% of annual electricity demand in the United States. In 2010
the United States’ federal government spent $1.1 billion in financial support for solar
energy development, representing more than a 500% increase from 2007 levels1. States
have also played a larger role in incentivizing renewables like solar by establishing
mandates broadly for renewable energy and specifically for solar energy. In addition
to mandates, generous financial incentives in the form of rebates and tax credits are
also being offered. In the case of residential applications, these financial incentives
have lowered the cost of installing a solar photovoltaic (PV) system by as much as
50%. Given the large amount of current and projected government expenditures that
go to solar incentive programs, it is important to determine what types of incentives
are effective, and to what extent they influence solar adoption.
Despite the fact that incentives for solar PV have become widespread, there are few
empirical studies that examine the effectiveness of specific policies used to promote
residential solar PV demand. To date, there is no empirical investigation of the impact
of solar PV incentives that parses the effects of various state policies and addresses
the potential for endogeneity of these policies. The purpose of this paper is to fill
this gap in the literature by presenting an empirical investigation of the impact of
1US federal spending to promote renewable energy technology totaled $14.7 billion in 2010,
growing significantly from its level of $5.1 million 2007. Federal spending to promote wind power
totaled $4.98 billion in 2010 and $476 million in 2007 (U.S. Energy Information Adiminstration
(EIA) 2011).
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state-level incentives on residential solar PV adoption. County level data are used to
examine the impact of state policy incentives for residential PV while accounting for
variation in demographics, solar resources, and environmental preferences using panel
data estimation. Yearly additions to residential solar PV capacity in kilowatts (kW)
is the dependent variable. The sample is comprised of counties in twelve northeastern
states between 2005 to 2012. Random effects and instrumental variable methods are
applied to a corner solution Tobit estimator to investigate the relationship between
residential PV capacity additions and a host of explanatory variables.
This paper improves upon the existing literature examining solar adoption in a
number of ways. First, individual representation of various policies enables the re-
searcher to parse the effectiveness of different policy options. Existing studies that
examine the drivers of residential solar energy adoption (solar hot water or PV) either
lump policy incentives in one variable (Kwan 2012) or do not consider them (Zahran
et al. 2008). Second, panel data are used to examine the impact of specific incentives
while controlling for temporally heterogeneous market forces. Previous studies (Kwan
2012; Zahran et al. 2008) rely on cross section data which, while informative, does
not exploit variation of solar technology prices, demographics, or state incentives over
time. Third, a rich set of environmental preference indicators including the percent-
age of county residents who buy organic foods, voting rates for the Democratic Party,
and sales of hybrid vehicles are included. Other studies typically use only voting
behavior in Presidential elections or support for a particular environmental regula-
tion to measure environmental preference. Kwan (2012) and Zahran et al. (2008)
use participation in the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives
(ICLEI) as a determinant of solar PV or solar hot water adoption at the county or
zip-code level. Following from findings that capitalization of solar PV-enabled homes
is higher in communities with a greater share of hybrid vehicles (Dastrup et al. 2012),
hybrid vehicle ownership rates are used as an additional indicator of environmental
2
preference. To my knowledge this is the first paper to jointly use these different as-
pects of consumption preferences and voting behavior to account for environmental
preferences.
Empirical results show that certain state policy incentives are effective at promot-
ing residential solar PV demand at the county level. The specific mandate for solar
energy, or “solar carve-out”, within the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is found
to be a driver of residential PV growth. Tax incentives, loan financing programs and
rebates are also significant. Unlike previous studies, evidence of consumer age and
education level being important predictors of PV demand is weak at best. These
results suggest that policy incentives play a significant role in increasing the demand
for solar energy, while previous findings about the effects of demographics are not well
supported. Hybrid vehicle ownership rates are found to be positively related to solar
PV adoption, suggesting the importance of environmental preferences in residential
PV demand.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a background of residential
solar PV adoption in the period 2005-2012 and discusses the availability of solar
policy incentives at the state level. Section 3 outlines the literature and section 4
discusses the research design. Section 5 presents data sources. Section 6 develops the
empirical methods used to obtain the main results of this paper. Section 7 discusses
the empirical findings and section 8 presents limitations. Section 9 concludes the
paper with a discussion of possible implications.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Over the last five years, solar PV technology has enjoyed a steep upward tend in
adoption across the United States (U.S.). In 2011 the U.S. was fourth in the world
behind Germany, Italy and China (Barbose, Darghouth, and Wiser 2012) for newly
installed grid-connected solar PV. Net electricity generation from solar power sources
has grown exponentially; between 2009 and 2013 annual net generation increased
by roughly 5000% from 157 to 8,327 thousand megawatt-hours. (U.S. Energy In-
formation Adiminstration (EIA) 2014). Meanwhile, growth in solar energy capacity
additions has shown no signs of slowing. Total operating solar PV capacity reached
12.1 GW by the end of 2013. New solar capacity additions in 2013 totaled 4,751 MW,
a 41% increase over 2012 additions. In 2013 solar capacity additions overtook wind
energy as the second-largest source of new energy generating capacity behind natu-
ral gas (U.S. Energy Information Adiminstration (EIA) 2014). Residential systems
represent an important market segment in the solar PV industry; with 792 MW of
newly installed grid-connected capacity, residential installations made up 17% of the
total U.S. photovoltaic market in 2013. Forecasts of solar PV capacity additions in
2014 project growth to be most rapid in the residential segment (GTM Research and
Solar Energy Industries Association 2014).
Concurrently, solar power industry revenues, employment, and wages have in-
creased steadily since 2007, with a strong upward trend projected to continue unin-
terrupted through 2018 (Smith 2013). However, while the U.S. solar power industry
has enjoyed substantial growth in recent years, the share of solar generated electricity
is small when compared with other energy sources. Net electricity generated from
solar energy accounted for only 0.2% of total electricity generated in the U.S. in 2013
(U.S. Energy Information Adiminstration (EIA) 2014).
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2.1 Experience in the states
Success with promoting solar PV adoption varies significantly across state lines. Cal-
ifornia dominates among the states in both PV capacity and the total number of
installed solar PV systems. In 2013 California nearly doubled it’s solar power gen-
erating potential with an additional 2,746 MW of installed solar capacity (GTM
Research and Solar Energy Industries Association 2014). As of June 2013, California
had more than twice the total PV capacity and more than seven times the number
of operating systems compared to the next leading state. When compared to Califor-
nia, success with solar technology adoption is relatively modest in the twelve states
analyzed in this study2,3. Nevertheless, New Jersey is third in the country behind
Arizona and the leading state in the Northeast with roughly 960 MW of total installed
capacity by the end of 2012. New Jersey is also the leading state in the Northeast
for residential PV capacity. Figure 1. ranks the Northeast states by total installed
residential capacity as of year-end 2012.
2The twelve states analyzed in this study are CT, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT,
WV, plus the District of Columbia.
3Total residential PV capacity in the twelve states plus Washington D.C. amounted to roughly
220 MW.
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Figure 1. Total residential PV capacity in 2012
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New Jersey has more than twice the stock of residential capacity compared with
the next leading state in the Northeast. New Jersey also leads the Northeast in yearly
demand for new installations. Figure 2. ranks the states analyzed in this study by
new residential solar PV capacity additions in 2012.
Figure 2. New residential solar PV capacity in 2012
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While New Jersey is still the runaway leader in the Northeast residential solar PV
6
market, Massachusetts and New York are seeing exciting gains in recent years. Each
state has witnessed increasing year-over-year additions. Figure 3. shows the growth of
year-over-year additions to residential capacity in the three leading states. Beginning
in 2008, New Jersey took off as the breakaway leader in the Northeast solar market.
Figure 3. Residential solar PV additions 2005 - 2012 (PA, MA, NJ, NY)
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Capacity additions in New Jersey experienced upward “kinks” between 2008-2009
and 2010-2011. In 2008, New Jersey introduced the Public Service Electric and Gas
(PSE&G) solar loan program to provide low interest financing to cover 40-60% of the
cost of a residential PV installation. The large jump in capacity from 2010 to 2011 in
New Jersey may be explained by changes made to the solar carve-out in 2011, when
the requirement for year-end solar energy generation was increased substantially.
Massachusetts also witnessed a surge in demand between 2010-2011, the same year
when the solar-carve out was first introduced in that state. New York had relatively
flat year-over-year adoption until 2012. It is unclear whether the jump in adoption
in New York was a result of state policy incentives or a consumer response to falling
solar panel prices. Adoption in Pennsylvania had a jumpy history between 2009 and
2012. In 2010 adoption increased substantially from the previous year, then dropped
7
off precipitously in 2011.
Figure 4. presents the adoption trends in Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Maine,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and the District of Columbia.
Figure 4. Residential solar PV additions 2005 - 2012
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Maryland, Vermont and the District of Columbia each have strong upward trends
in yearly PV demand, with no indication that the residential PV market is becoming
saturated in those states. In recent years, year-over-year residential capacity additions
in Connecticut and Delaware are decreasing or leveling off. In Maine, Rhode Island
and West Virginia the residential PV market has yet to gain momentum.
2.2 State policy incentives
State governments have implemented a range of policy initiatives aimed at increasing
the share of solar PV electricity in the U.S. energy mix4. In 2011 alone, legislatures
in ten states enacted various innovative financial incentives directed at increasing res-
idential PV capacity (DSIRE 2013). Renewable portfolio standards have received the
4See Appendix B for a complete treatment of state solar policy incentives
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most attention in case studies and empirical analyses. Renewable portfolio standards
(RPS) are regulations which mandate that a specific share of a state’s electricity sales
must be generated from renewable energy (RE) sources. Carley (2009) and Yin and
Powers (2010) show empirically that RPS implementation is associated with positive
growth of in-state RE generation. Findings by Maguire (2011) and Adelaja et al.
(2010) provide evidence that RPS positively influence wind energy adoption. How-
ever, Carley (2009) points out that RPS generally fail at achieving their stated goal
of increasing the share of RE generation in a state’s total energy mix.
In a descriptive analysis of states’ experiences with RPS policies thus far, Wiser,
Barbose, and Holt (2011) emphasize the need to include technology-specific standards
into RPS designs to promote diversity in RE markets. One method has been to amend
existing RPS mandates to include a carve-out for solar energy generation. A solar
carve-out is a minimum requirement for a state’s electric utilities year-end solar energy
sales. The carve-out can be structured either as a percentage of the total energy mix,
or as a net total of solar energy generation. Of the 29 states plus the District of
Columbia with active RPS policies, 16 states and the District of Columbia have
included a solar carve-out. New Jersey currently has the most aggressive support for
solar energy with a carve-out which is designed to reach 4.1% solar energy generation
in the state’s energy mix by 2028.
A solar carve-out goes hand in hand with a solar renewable energy credit (SREC)
market. SRECs are solar energy production credits awarded per kilowatt hour (kWh)
to owners of grid-connected solar PV systems. Homeowners with a grid-connected
solar PV system generate SRECs based on actual energy produced by the system.
Aggregation firms sell bundles of SRECs to utilities in the state’s renewable energy
credit market. In states with a solar carve-out, utilities are obligated to meet solar
energy sales requirements either by installing solar power facilities, buying SRECs in
the open market, or paying year-end solar alternative compliance payments (SACP).
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High SACP prices mean that utilities are subject to greater penalties for failing to
meet year-end solar energy sales requirements. Utilities subject to high year-end
SACPs may push to promote solar energy generation in order to comply with the
solar carve-out regulations at least cost. By expanding solar generation capacity a
utility is able to increase the supply of SRECs, thereby driving down SREC prices
and lowering compliance costs.
The specific structure and regulation of SREC markets varies by state. In Mas-
sachusetts, SRECs expire at the end of each trading year, at which point they are
deposited in the Solar Credit Clearinghouse Auction (SCCA). In Pennsylvania SRECs
have a three year life span, and systems located in fourteen (14) states are eligible
to produce SRECs for the Pennsylvania market. New Jersey SRECs are useful for
five (5) years and can be generated only by systems located in the state. Despite
differing market structures, the ability to generate and sell SRECs provides an ad-
ditional financial incentive to households located in an SREC-enabled state. The
amount of incentive depends on the amount of energy produced by the system, i.e.,
the number of SRECs generated, and the final sale price of the SRECs. Figure 5.
shows the historical SREC prices and corresponding SACPs in the six states with a
solar carve-out.
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Figure 5. SREC and SACP prices 2005 - 2012
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Markets for SRECs opened between 2007 and 2009. Everywhere but the District
of Columbia, average yearly SREC market prices have declined significantly after the
first years of market operation. This trend may be explained by the simultaneous na-
ture of SREC prices and solar PV demand. As demand for solar PV systems increases,
possibly due in part to the SREC incentive, the amount of solar energy generating
capacity increases. More capacity means more potential for generating SRECs to
sell in the market. This trend drives SREC prices downward as the markets become
oversupplied. Meanwhile, deflated SREC prices provide less financial incentive for
an individual homeowner to invest in a solar PV system. This inverse relationship
can be seen in New Jersey’s SREC market. Figure 6. is a plot of SREC prices over
additions to new residential PV capacity in New Jersey.
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Figure 6. Capacity additions and SREC Prices in NJ
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In 2012 residential PV demand in New Jersey continued to increase despite falling
SREC market prices. The same was true in Massachusetts, where substantial gains
to residential PV capacity were made despite a steep decline in SREC prices. In
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, residential PV demand followed SREC prices very
closely.
Figure 7. Capacity additions and SREC Prices in PA
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SREC markets have had mixed success with promoting an in-state residential
solar PV industry. The solar industries of New Jersey and Massachusetts matured to
the point where a drop in SREC prices did not significantly effect demand for new
solar installations. However, the solar markets in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware
and the District of Columbia seem to be sensitive to volatility in SREC prices.
In addition to solar carve-out policies, more traditional incentives have been used
to boost residential solar PV demand. Tax incentives are designed to reduce the
high up-front costs of installing a solar PV system. Tax credits, deductions, and
exemptions from personal, property, and sales taxes aim to reduce the tax liability of
early adopters. Many states use a combination of tax-based incentive mechanisms.
Roughly twenty states offer sales tax exemptions for the cost of solar equipment,
thirty states offer property tax exemptions for homes with solar PV systems, and
twenty states and the District of Columbia provide income tax credits.
Rebate programs provide direct cash subsidies towards the up-front costs of in-
stalling a solar PV system, often awarded on a dollar per system kW capacity basis.
Rebates are more politically charged than other incentives as they require appropria-
tion of state funds. Sixteen states and the District of Columbia currently have active
rebate programs. In Massachusetts, the Commonwealth Solar Rebate II program is
allotted $4 million per year since 2003, funded by a $0.0005 per kWh surcharge on
electricity bills in the state.
In addition to direct financial incentives, states also provide regulatory support
which can protect solar PV consumers and decrease the up-front financial burden of
a solar PV investment. Such laws are referred to as consumer support policies in
this paper. Two variables are used to capture the effects of solar consumer support
policies: solar rights and loan programs. Solar rights are state laws which prohibit
local governments from enacting regulations or ordinances restricting a home owner’s
ability to install a solar energy system. Solar rights laws are common among North-
13
eastern states and have generally been in place since the last 1970’s. More recently,
state loan programs are supporting residential installations by providing fixed interest
financing for the cost of a solar PV installation. Of the states analyzed in this study,
only New Jersey and Pennsylvania implemented loan programs.
Active state interest in providing financial incentives raises several research ques-
tions which have yet to be comprehensively addressed. It is unclear whether adoption
trends are a manifestation of availability of solar resources, i.e., sunshine, individual
homeowner characteristics such as income, or genuine responses to state incentive
policies. This paper seeks to answer whether policy incentives are effective at pro-
moting adoption, which incentives are most effective, and what are the prevailing
characteristics of homeowners who are likely to invest in a solar PV system.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing literature on solar adoption in the United States consists mainly of stud-
ies that evaluate states’ experiences with specific RE incentive policies. Wiser et al.
(2007) provide an overview of different approaches to RPS policy design. Wiser, Bar-
bose, and Holt (2011) follow up by summarizing states’ experiences with supporting
solar power through various RPS policy designs. The authors cite an increasingly
expanding wind energy industry as strong evidence that technology-neutral RPS
programs do promote low-risk, large-scale wind power development. However, the
authors point out that diversity in RE technologies is unlikely without solar-specific
RPS instruments such as a solar carve-out and robust SREC markets.
Couture and Cory (2009) refer to European experience with RE incentives to argue
for the effectiveness of feed-in-tarrifs (FITs)5 over other incentives, citing superior
cost-effectiveness and more rapid adoption responses. Timilsina, Kurdgelashvili, and
Narbel (2012) conduct a general assessment of solar PV policies and adoption rates
around the world. The authors conclude that despite rapidly decreasing solar module
prices, the main barrier to large-scale solar PV adoption is competition with low fossil
fuel prices.
Due to wider data availability for wind projects, much of the empirical literature
on state policy effectiveness for promoting RE has focused on wind energy adoption.
Menz and Vachon (2006) were first to use multivariate techniques to evaluate the
effectiveness of different state policies on wind power adoption. They use cross-
sectional data and an ordinary least squares methodology with four related dependent
variables, each providing a measure for growth in wind power development. Notably,
they include two metrics for each policy variable; one is a binary variable for the
5See Appendix B for a discussion of feed-in-tarrif policies.
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existence of a given policy, while another counts the total number of years the policy
had been in effect. They find that although RPS policies are successful at increasing
the total amount of RE generation, most states largely fall short of their ultimate
goal of increasing the share of RE in the total energy mix. Carley (2009) arrives at
similar results by performing an empirical analysis with the addition of a time series
from 1998 to 2006. Rather than focus on wind energy alone, the author evaluates the
effect of RPS policies on RE production in general. With 48 states observed over 6
years, Carley (2009) achieves a sample size of 432 observations, which is a significant
improvement over the Menz and Vachon (2006) sample of 37 states.
Kneifel (2008) follows by finding a positive effect of RPS on total non-hydroelectric
renewable capacity additions between 1996 and 2003. Maguire (2011) conducts a sim-
ilar panel analysis focusing specifically on wind development in 25 states. The author
finds that RPS implementations does have a significant positive impact on a states’
cumulative wind capacity. Notably, Maguire (2011) finds that electricity market fac-
tors play a significant role in determining wind energy development, holding all else
constant. While these initial studies lay the groundwork for empirical investigations
of RE policy effectiveness, their estimation results suffer from a limited time horizon,
small sample sizes and an oversimplification of policy variables. By using strictly
binary variables for RPS policies they fail to capture variation in RPS design among
the states, which can lead to significant differences in solar PV adoption rates.
Yin and Powers (2010) address state policy heterogeneity by constructing a mea-
sure of RPS stringency as an independent variable. Additionally, the authors use a
measure of in-state dependency on out-of-state generated electricity to test whether
states that relies heavily on energy imports have stronger tendencies to develop re-
newable energy. Using a fixed-effects panel data analysis, the authors find that the
effectiveness of state RE incentive policies is indeed obscured when policy hetero-
geneity is ignored. As with previous empirical studies, the authors analyze policy
16
effectiveness at the state level. This low geographic resolution precludes analysis of
important variability in renewable energy adoption at the county level.
More recently, Hitaj (2013) uses a Tobit model in a panel analysis of utility-scale
wind capacity additions by county. The author uses a monte carlo simulation to
demonstrate that the Tobit model remains robust under a very high proportion of
corner solution observations. Zahran et al. (2008) and Kwan (2012), among others,
circumvent the corner solution issue by appealing to a discrete distribution of count
data. Kwan (2012) studies adoption of residential solar PV systems using system
counts at the zip code level. Zahran et al. (2008) investigates the determinants of
solar hot water system counts by county. Both studies employ a zero-inflated negative
binomial (ZINB) model to address the large number of zero values in the data. The
ZINB model assumes that there are two distinct data generating process at play; a
binary response which determines the presence of solar energy systems, and another
process which determines the number of systems. This requires a two-step procedure
in which the binary response is estimated with a logistic regression and the magnitude
of non-zero discrete responses follows a probit model.
While the ZINB model lends itself well to cross-sectional count data, it does not
allow for a continuous dependent variable. In this paper the dependent variable is
a continuous measure of residential solar PV demand. A capacity analysis of solar
PV adoption represents several improvements over previous empirical work which
focused on system counts. By focusing on kW capacity additions rather than PV
system counts, the empirical results provide more incite to address the policy maker’s
problem. In general, state legislators are interested in a policy which will increase the
number of adopters as well as the energy generating capacity of individual installa-
tions. Since the primary goal of state solar policy incentives is to increase the amount
of electricity generated by solar PV systems, it is important to investigate capacity
trends as well as system counts.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN
Based on previous findings in empirical literature as well as demand and supply the-
ory, variables that effect a household’s decision to install solar PV can be identified.
Previous studies of solar technology adoption found that income level, consumer age,
education level, and urbanization (Kwan 2012; Zahran et al. 2008; Lutzenhiser 1993;
Labay and Kinnear 1981) are significant determinants of residential solar technology
demand. These variables are likely to affect purchasing power, discounting prefer-
ences, or environmental awareness. Demand and supply theory indicates that the
cost is an important determinant of demand, thus state policies that reduce the cost
of a residential PV system are added to the specification.
4.1 Demographic factors
A median home value variable is used as a proxy for income level. Consumption
age is measured by a single continuous variable for median age. The percentage of
the population with a bachelors degree or higher measures educational attainment.
Education level is expected to be positively related to solar PV demand, while con-
sumption age is expected to have a negative effect, based on findings by Kwan (2012).
Population density, calculated as the total population weighted by land area, is used
to measure urbanization effects. The number of owner occupied households is used as
a scaling control to justify comparisons among counties of different sizes. An inherent
assumption of this paper is that residential solar capacity additions are exclusive to
rooftops of owner-occupied households. It is important to distinguish between the
number of households as a scaling control rather than a measure of urbanization,
which is captured separately by population density.
The share of electricity generated from solar PV (and thus the cost savings at-
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tributed to solar PV) is determined in large part by the amount of solar resources
available to the household. Solar resource abundance has been previously shown to
be an important determinant of solar technology adoption (Zahran et al. 2008; Kwan
2012). Thus, a variable for average annual solar radiation (solar insolation) is in-
cluded. Households with greater access to solar resources will expect greater energy
bill savings, reduced payback periods on the solar PV investment, and potentially
greater returns from production-based policy incentives like SREC markets. Higher
levels of solar insolation are expected to lead to higher levels of adoption.
Timilsina, Kurdgelashvili, and Narbel (2012) found that the world price of solar
panels as well as installation costs decreased substantially in the years between 2005
and 2012. A linear time trend variable is included in order to capture changes in
the price of solar panels over time. Residential demand may also be affected by the
size of the local solar PV market in the previous year. A community with many
early adopters may experience more marketing effort from installation firms as well
as lower installation prices due to installer experience. Additionally, the presence of
solar panels in a community may reduce perceived uncertainty about the technology.
A homeowner who is on the fence about investing in a costly rooftop array may be
induced to buy by neighbors with visible solar panels on their rooftops. Solar market
size and the “keeping up with the Joneses” effects are measured by the number of
residential solar PV installation in the previous year.
Electricity prices are also expected to effect adoption decisions. Homeowners
subject to higher electricity prices have more to gain by offsetting electricity bills
over the lifespan of a solar PV system. It is expected that a higher electricity price
will increase the likelihood that a household will choose to invest in a solar PV system.
Equation (1) presents the “naive” model of residential solar PV demand. Residential
PV demand (Yit) is measured as the kilowatt (kW) amount of new residential solar
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PV capacity in county i, in year t.
Yit = g(Xit, Gi) (1)
Vectors Xit and Gi contain the explanatory variables discussed above. Gi contains
time-invariant variables, which is a data limitation discussed in the following chapter.
This model is considered naive because it excludes important state policy effects and
does not control for environmental preferences.
4.2 Financial incentives and consumer support policies
Factors that increase the value of a solar PV investment increase the likelihood of
adoption by a household in a given year, and vice versa. In general, the lower the net
cost of installing solar PV the greater the likelihood of adoption. The net cost to the
household can depend in large part on the amount of financial assistance obtained
from solar incentive programs. A host of variables for state financial incentives which
lower the net cost of PV installation are included.
SREC prices are used to measure the effects of a solar carve-out on residential PV
demand. The price of SRECs can have a significant impact on adoption decisions. A
household considering investing in a PV system will look at the current market price
of SRECs to approximate the amount of production incentive they can expect. High
SREC prices will translate into more dollars per kilowatt hour in the pocket of the
solar PV homeowner, decreasing the pay-back period for the solar PV investment.
Residential adoption is expected grow with higher SREC prices. For states with no
solar carve-out, the SREC price remains zero for all time periods.
In addition to the solar carve-out, states provide PV consumer support in the forms
of tax incentives, rebates, loan programs, and solar rights regulations. Each policy
decreases the upfront cost of a solar PV investment. The incentive value of a sales
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tax exemption is measured by the state’s sales tax rate. A higher sales tax indicates
a larger discount when the tax is exempted by the state policy. Two additional tax
incentive variables measure the effects of property tax abatements and income tax
credits. Also included is a variable for the availability of direct cash rebates to solar
PV households. Rebates are typically awarded on a per kilowatt hour capacity basis
so that larger systems receive higher subsidies.
Loan programs decrease the up-front cost of installation and guarantee fixed rates
at levels unavailable from traditional lenders. Finally, solar rights regulations pro-
hibit local (municipal or county) governments from passing ordinances which limit
homeowners’ rights to install a rooftop solar PV array. Variables for tax incentives,
rebates, state loan programs and solar rights regulations are expected to have positive
effects on residential adoption.
Following Menz and Vachon (2006) and Yin and Powers (2010), an RPS trend
variable is included to capture the number of years an RPS has been in effect. In-
cluding an RPS trend variable is useful to test previous findings (Wiser et al. 2007;
Wiser, Barbose, and Holt 2011) that an RPS without a solar carve-out fails to pro-
mote solar technology adoption. An RPS with no technology-specific standards may
promote least-cost technologies to the detriment of the solar PV market, therefore the
RPS trend variable is expected to have a negative or insignificant effect. Equation
(2) updates the naive model to include variables for state incentive policies in vector
Kit.
Yit = g(Xit, Gi, Kit) (2)
4.3 Environmental preferences
Several studies show that non-economic factors such as the desire to help address
environmental externalities, contribute to the public good, gain prestige, and “feel
good” about oneself could also motivate solar PV adoption (Andreoni 1990; Sidiras
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and Koukios 2004; Sexton and Sexton 2011). Three variables are used to proxy house-
holds’ propensity to make green investments due to non-financial considerations: the
share of hybrid-electric vehicles in new vehicle registrations, the percentage of house-
holds that purchase organic food, and the percentage of Democratic Party voters.
Each of the environmental preference indicators are expected to be positively related
to residential solar PV demand. Equation (3) presents the final specification, which
includes demographic and housing characteristic variables in vectors Xit and Gi, state
incentive policy variables in vector Kit, and environmental preference indicators in
vector Pit as well as vector Gi
6.
Yit = g(Xit, Gi, Kit, Pit) (3)
6Variables measuring organic food consumption and Democratic Party affiliation are time invari-
ant and thus included in the time-invariant vector Gi. This is a data limitation which is addressed
in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA
This section outlines the data sources which were used to build the sample of counties
in twelve states from 2005 to 2012.
5.1 Solar adoption
Data on residential solar PV installations were obtained from the National Renewable
Energy Lab (NREL) Open PV Project. The Open PV Project is a public database
which provides location and kW capacity information for all solar PV projects in
the United States. We obtain date from 2005-2012 for the following states: Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, and the District of
Columbia. Following Barbose, Darghouth, and Wiser (2012) and Kwan (2012), an
upper limit of 10 kW capacity is used to denote residential PV systems. Geographic
Information System (GIS) software was used to spatially reference and aggregate
individual residential PV systems to the county level. County boundary shape-files
were obtained from the U.S. Census Bereau Tiger/Line shapefile database.
5.2 Electricity prices and solar resource
Yearly state average electricity prices were obtained from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (www.eia.gov). Residential electricity prices are averaged yearly for
the total electric industry by state, measured in cents per kilowatt hour (¢/kWh).
Electricity prices are not indexed or adjusted for inflation.
The average annual solar resource was calculated using data developed by the
State University of New York/Albany satellite radiation model. Solar resource (solar
insolation) is measured in kilowatt-hours per square meter per day (kWh/m2/day).
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Ten kilometer grid cells of annual average daily total solar resource were spatially
referenced and aggregated to obtain annual averages for each county.
5.3 State incentives for solar PV
State policy incentive variables were constructed using the Database of State Incen-
tives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE 2013). State sales taxes are used to
capture heterogeneity of sales tax incentive policies. Loan program availability, solar
rights laws, personal tax credits and property tax exemptions are included as binary
variables, which take on a value of one if the county is located in a state which provides
these incentives. Rebate availability is likewise represented by a binary variable. Rep-
resentation of these policies as binary variables is a limitation of the available data; in
reality, rebate amounts, tax liabilities, and loan program rates differ across state lines.
Nevertheless, the binary policy variables do capture important differences among the
financial incentives available to homeowners in different states.
5.3.1 SREC prices and SACP
Solar renewable energy credit (SREC) market prices and solar alternative compliance
payment (SACP) prices were obtained from www.SRECtrade.com. One SREC is
equivalent to one megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity generation. The market price
of SRECs is averaged for each year in the study period. All counties within the same
state are subject to the state market price of SRECs. Solar alternative compliance
payments (SACP) are used as an instrument for SREC prices in an instrumental
variable specification. Variables for SREC prices and SACPs take on a zero value in
states with no solar carve-out.
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5.4 Environmental preferences
Three variables are used as indicators of environmental preferences. The percentage
of county residents who buy organic food was obtained from Geographic Research
Inc. (2011). Presidential election results from 2008, obtained from National Atlas
of the United States (2009), were used to calculate the percentage of Democratic
Party votes by county in the 2008 presidential election. Yearly hybrid vehicle sales
for personal transportation by county were obtained from the consulting firm R. L.
Polk.
5.5 Demographic and housing characteristics
County-level yearly data from 2005-2012 on median age, median household income,
median home value, number of owner-occupied housing units and total population
were obtained from American Factfinder, a web service of the U.S. Census Bureau
American Community Survey.
Table 1. presents summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables.
The dependent variable is yearly solar PV demand, which is measured by new ad-
ditions to residential PV capacity in kilowatts. Column 1 is the variable name with
units. Housing density, population density and median home values are used in nat-
ural log form to correct for highly skewed distributions. Column 2 indicates the level
of variation for each variable, where “C” is for county, “S” is for state, and “Y” is for
year.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Varies by Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variable
PV capacity additions C, Y 105.891 357.184 0 7467.045
Independent variables
Solar resource (kWh/m2/day) C 4.491 0.199 4.085 5.007
ln(Owner-occupied homes) C, Y 10.381 1.147 7.34 12.908
ln(Population density) C, Y 5.43 1.571 1.035 11.18
Electricity price (¢/kWh) S 13.9 3.315 6.21 20.33
Bachelor degree or higher (%) C, Y 29.769 12.542 3.925 83.252
Median Age C, Y 40.203 3.08 27.3 51
ln(Median home value) C, Y 12.033 0.591 10.325 13.816
SREC Price ($) S, Y 72.397 154.789 0 664.5
Sales tax exemption (%) S, Y 3.641 3.75 0 8.48
Rebate (d) S, Y 0.457 0.498 0 1
RPS trend S, Y 4.872 3.546 0 15
Income tax credit (d) S, Y 0.349 0.477 0 1
Property tax incentive (d) S, Y 0.433 0.496 0 1
Loan program (d) S, Y 0.182 0.386 0 1
Solar rights (d) S, Y 0.196 0.397 0 1
Hybrid vehicle sales (%) C, Y 1.932 1.071 0 10.986
Democrats (%) C 51.679 11.92 23.64 92.5
Organic consumers (%) C 26.295 4.753 15.72 40.19
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
†Natural log transformed values
*Population density calculated by Total populationLand area with county land area measured
in square miles (mi2).
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CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND CHOICE OF ESTIMATION METHODS
The main empirical goal of this paper is to accurately represent the drivers of solar
PV adoption decisions. As discussed in the literature review, there is not a clear con-
sensus about the drivers of residential solar PV demand in the United States. Several
studies point to the importance of demographics and environmental preferences in
solar PV adoption decisions, but responses to state policies have not been thoroughly
explored. In pursuit of thoroughness, the empirical model is built on the hypothesized
determinants of a household’s decision to install a solar PV system in a given year.
For the empirical investigation household decisions are aggregated to the county
level. Aggregate household demand for solar PV systems is measured by additions to
residential solar PV capacity, in kilowatts (kW), per county in a given year. Additions
to county residential solar PV capacity are observed from 2005 to 2012. The analytical
model in chapter 4 informs the choice of explanatory variables. Equation 4 is the
hypothesized linear function of county-year residential solar PV demand.
Yit = α +Xitβ +Giγ +Kitκ+ Pitζ + it (4)
where Y is additions to residential PV capacity in county i in year t and it is the
error vector. Average installed solar kW capacity in all counties and time periods,
holding all control variables constant at zero, is captured by the intercept α. The
vector X consists of independent variables which vary over time: electricity price,
the percent of homeowners with a bachelor degree or higher, the natural log value
of median home value, median age, the natural log value of the number of owner-
occupied homes, population density, and the percent of new hybrid vehicle sales.
Natural log transformations of median home value and the number of owner-occupied
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homes are taken to normalize the highly right-skewed distributions of their values in
levels. G contains the time-invariant variables: average annual solar resource, percent
households using organic food, and the percentage of Democratic Party votes in the
2008 presidential election. K contains the state policy variables: sales tax exemption,
SREC price, and the number of years the RPS has been in effect. P contains the set of
binary variables indicating availability of the following state incentives and consumer
supports: property and personal tax credit, direct cash rebate, solar rights, and loan
program. Each term in parameter vector ζ represents the effect of a discrete change
from 0 to 1 in the corresponding term in P .
6.1 Limitations of the linear model
In the solar technology adoption context, a potential problem with estimating the
linear model is the high number of counties with no solar installations for a given year.
Thirty one percent of the county-year observations in the data have zero solar capacity.
This implies that 31% of linear combinations of explanatory variables included in
the model are associated with zero in the dependent variable. In this paper I will
refer to zero values in the dependent variables as corner solutions, as put forth by
Wooldridge (2010). Figure 8. provides a visual illustration of the high proportion of
corner solutions in the data.
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Figure 8. Visual signs of a corner solution
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The scatter plots in the bottom row show that many observations are bunched at
the bottom of the graph where solar capacity additions are zero. While the dependent
variable is partially continuous, it is limited with a probability mass point at zero.
The linear model in Equation 4 is problematic because combinations of the right hand
side variables may result in negative predictions of solar adoption. Negative values of
solar adoption are not reflective of the data generating process. A least squares model
will impose a linear association to this data which is highly non-linear in nature. It
is shown below that parameter estimates obtained from ordinary least squares (OLS)
are bias and inconsistent.
To accommodate a dependent variable with a probability mass point at zero and
a continuous distribution in the non-negative range we employ the Tobit model devel-
oped by Tobin (1958). The Tobit estimator is a maximum likelihood procedure which
was originally developed to deal with issues that arise when estimating household de-
cisions to invest in durable goods. However, in more recent econometrics literature
and in many textbooks the Tobit model is almost exclusively referred to as a censored
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regression model. One exception is in the econometrics text by Wooldridge (2010),
in which the author makes a clear distinction between a censored regression Tobit
model and a corner solution Tobit. Inconsistency in the literature about how to refer
to the Tobit model arises because the same econometric procedure is useful in the
context of two distinct theoretical applications. For example, when the dependent
variable for income is top coded at $100,000, the Tobit model is correctly referred to
as a censored regression. In that case there are observations in the sample which are
artificially censored at some arbitrary point, and the distribution of the observed de-
pendent variable does not accurately reflect the sampling distribution. This contrasts
with the context of household investments in durable goods, where expenditures are
positive when the utility of investment exceeds an unobserved threshold, and zero
otherwise. The same is true in the solar technology adoption context. Household so-
lar PV capacity additions are strictly positive with a probability mass point at zero.
When these decisions are aggregated the county level the lower limit remains at zero.
Zero solar PV capacity addition in a county simply reflects that no new residential
solar PV systems were installed in the given year. This is distinct from a censored
regression context because the dependent variable is fully observed. The sample fully
represents the data generating process, and the observed limit of the data is the true
limit of the sampling distribution, i.e., the zeros observed in the dependent variable
are true zeros.
6.2 Development of the Tobit model
To estimate the linear model in Equation (4) with a corner solution at zero, a latent
variable model is introduced such that
Y ∗ = Xβ +  (5)
 ∼ N (0, σ2) (6)
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where  follows the classical assumptions and is orthogonal to X, such that E[|X] =
0. For notational convenience, the right hand side variables from Equation 4 are
compressed into matrix X, with i and t subscripts suppressed to remove notational
clutter. Y ∗ is a latent variable which meets the classical linear assumptions. Herein
lies the crux of the difference between a corner solution model and a censored Tobit
model. Take again the example of a researcher interested in estimating the determi-
nants of income, with income data top coded at $100,000. For that case the focus
will be estimating E[Y ∗|X]. In this paper the main interest lies in E[Y |X], i.e., the
expected amount of installed residential solar PV capacity given the observed ex-
planatory variables. While the latent variable can potentially be interpreted as the
desired amount of residential solar PV, the focus of this paper is in estimating the
determinants of observed household decisions to invest in solar PV. The observed
values of residential solar PV capacity by county for a given year can be expressed as
Y =

Y ∗, if Y ∗ > L
L, if Y ∗ ≤ L
(7)
where L is the lower limit of zero residential solar PV capacity. With L = 0,
equation 7 can also be written
Y = max [0, Y ∗] (8)
Y = max [0, Xβ + ] (9)
Because equation 8 is a convex function, the conditional Jensen’s inequality (see
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Appendix A) can be applied.
E[Y |X] ≥max [0, E(Y ∗)],
E[Y |X] ≥max [0, E(Xβ + )],
E[Y |X] ≥max [0, Xβ + E()],
E[Y |X] ≥max [0, Xβ] (10)
where E()=0. By assuming a zero conditional mean for the error term, Equation
10 gives E[Y |X] a lower bound as a function of Xβ. Next, by the law of iterated
expectations
E[Y |X] = P (Y < 0|X)E[Y |X, Y < 0]
+ P (Y = 0|X)E[Y |X, Y = 0]
+ P (Y > 0|X)E[Y |X, Y > 0].
By Equation (9), E[Y |X, Y < 0] = 0 and E[Y |X, Y = 0] = 0, thus
E[Y |X] = P (Y > 0|X)E[Y |X, Y > 0] (11)
The goal is to derive explicit expressions of the two right hand side terms the above
expression. First, to obtain P (Y > 0|X), let d be a binary variable such that
d =

1, if Y > 0
0, if Y = 0
(12)
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whereby d = 1 when Y ∗ > 0 and d = 0 when Y ∗ ≤ 0.
P (Y > 0|X) = P (d = 1|X) = P (Y ∗ > 0|X),
= P (Xβ +  > 0|X),
= P ( > −Xβ|X),
= P
( 
σ
> −Xβ
σ
)
applying Property 2 (see Appendix A) and symmetry of the normal distribution,
P (Y > 0|X) = 1− Φ
(
− Xβ
σ
)
= Φ
(Xβ
σ
)
(13)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. This gives an
explicit form for the first term in Equation 11. The next term is found by
E[Y |X, Y > 0] = E[Xβ + |X,  > −Xβ]
= E[Xβ|X,  > −Xβ] + E[|X,  > −Xβ]
= Xβ + E[|X,  > −Xβ]
applying Property 3 (see Appendix A) and symmetry of the normal distribution,
E[Y |X, Y > 0] = Xβ + σ
[
φ(Xβ
σ
)
1− Φ(−Xβ
σ
)
]
= Xβ + σ
[
φ(Xβ
σ
)
Φ(Xβ
σ
)
]
(14)
where φ is the standard normal probability density function. Since E[Y |X, Y >
0] = E[Y ∗|X, Y ∗ > 0], the expression above shows that the OLS model will result in
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates because an additional term needs to be
estimated. The extra term is σ times the inverse Mills ratio. For any value a, the
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inverse Mills ration is defined as λ(a) = φ(a)/Φ(a). In equation 14 the inverse Mills
ratio is evaluated as
λ
(Xβ
σ
)
=
[
φ(Xβ
σ
)
Φ(Xβ
σ
)
]
(15)
This expression will be useful for derriving marginal effects. Combining Equations 13
and 14, the expression in Equation 11 can be expressed explicitly as
E[Y |X] = Φ
(Xβ
σ
)
Xβ + σφ
(Xβ
σ
)
(16)
Several important features of the Tobit model are apparent from Equation 16. The
expected value of the dependent variable is not a linear function in the parameters.
Simply removing the corner solution observations and proceeding to estimate by OLS
is not a valid solution. Another interesting result is that the partial effect of an
explanatory variable Xj will be a function of β as well as σ. Most importantly, the
expression in Equation 16 points to the Tobit estimator’s heavy reliance on a normally
distributed and exogenous error term. If  does not meet these assumptions then the
Tobit model will provide inconsistent parameter estimates.
6.2.1 Marginal effects in the Tobit model
Interest lies in the marginal effects on the observed dependent variable. Namely,
interest lies in estimating the partial effects ∂E[Y |X]
∂Xj
and ∂E[Y >0|X]
∂Xj
. The latter expres-
sion is obtained by returning to Equation (14). The conditional expected value of the
dependent variable can be expressed as
∂E[Y > 0|X]
∂Xj
= βj
{
1− λ
(Xβ
σ
)[Xβ
σ
+ λ
(Xβ
σ
)]}
(17)
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This is a convenient expression because it explicitly states the adjustment factor
on the partial effect βj. The adjustment factor determines the bias on coefficient
estimates in an OLS regression on the non-zero observations. Marginal effects on
the unconditional expectation of Y are obtained by taking the partial derivative of
Equation (16) with respect to the explanatory variable of interest
∂E[Y |X]
∂Xj
= βjΦ
(Xβ
σ
)
(18)
Since the Tobit model in this paper is specified with a log-normal latent variable,
the calculated marginal effects give semi-elasticities. The next section develops the
maximum likelihood procedure for obtaining Tobit parameter estimates.
6.2.2 Maximum likelihood estimation of the Tobit model
The goal is to find the likelihood function that specifies the joint density of Y across
all possible values, including Y = 0 and Y > 0. The probability density function
of Y , f(Y ), will be equal to the probability density function (pdf) of Y ∗, f ∗(Y ), for
all d = 1. At the limit, when d = 0, the probability density of Y is equal to the
joint probability density of all Y ∗ ≤ 0, which can be expressed as the cumulative
distribution function (cdf), F ∗(0). Therefore, the conditional density of Y is given by
f(y|x) = f ∗(y|x)dF ∗(0)1−d (19)
where d is the binary indicator of Y > 0. The probability density of Y is a combination
of the cdf and the pdf of Y ∗. Taking the reverse of Equation 13, the probability mass
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of Y ∗ evaluated at the limit is
F ∗(0) = P (Y ∗ ≤ 0),
P (Y ∗ ≤ 0|X) = P (Xβ +  ≤ 0),
= P ( ≤ −Xβ),
= P
( 
σ
≤ −Xβ
σ
)
applying Property 2 (see Appendix A) and symmetry of the standard normal distribution,
F ∗(0) = Φ
(
− Xβ
σ
)
= 1− Φ
(Xβ
σ
)
(20)
The conditional pdf of Y ∗, assuming that Y ∗|X ∼ (Xβ, σ2), is given by the standard
normal pdf evaluated at mean Xβ and standard deviation σ,
f ∗(Y,Xβ, σ) =
1√
2piσ2
exp
{
− (Y −Xβ)
2
2σ2
}
(21)
Therefore, the pdf in Equation 19 can be written explicitly as
f(Y |X) =
[
1√
2piσ2
exp
{
− (Y −Xβ)
2
2σ2
}]d[
1− Φ
(Xβ
σ
)]1−d
(22)
Taking the natural logarithm transformation, this becomes
lnf(Y |X) = d
(
− 1
2
ln2pi − 1
2
lnσ2 − 1
2σ2
(Y −Xβ)2
)
+ (1− d)ln
(
1− Φ
(Xβ
σ
)) (23)
Let L(θ) = f(Y |X, θ), where θ is the vector of parameters parameter which maximizes
the log likelihood. Therefore, the Tobit corner solution model maximizes the log-
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likelihood function
lnL(θ) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
{
dit
(
− 1
2
ln2pi − 1
2
lnσ2 − 1
2σ2
(Yit −Xitβ)2
)
+ (1− dit)ln(1− Φ
(Xitβ
σ
)} (24)
Note that the observations are summed across all i and t. This is equivalent to esti-
mating one cross section of NT observations, also known as a pooled Tobit maximum
likelihood model. However, a pooled model does not exploit panel heterogeneity.
There are likely to be county-specific effects; some counties may be predisposed to
solar adoption for reasons which are not addressed by the included explanatory vari-
ables. For example, in Massachusetts, the Solarize Mass program provides funding
for solar educational campaigns and installation cost discounts at the municipal level.
Cities and towns which opt-in to voluntary state programs are more likely to have
solar energy adoption. In New York, the Long Island Power Authority provides a
rebate for solar PV installations. All unobserved effects of local solar incentives are
subsumed in the grand error it.
6.3 Unobserved county heterogeneity
Both fixed effects and random effects methods are feasible with the Tobit estimator.
The fixed effects model is ruled out because time invariant explanatory variables be-
come unidentified. The data for solar insolation and the percentage of democratic
votes are both time invariant. Excluding these important predictors will cause omit-
ted variable bias. The next section extends the Tobit MLE to address a random effect
to capture unobserved county heterogeneity .
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6.3.1 Random effects Tobit model
The linear model for the latent variable is revised, such that
Y ∗it = Xitβ + ui + it (25)
it ∼ N(0, σ2 ) (26)
ui ∼ N(0, σ2u) (27)
where ui is the random parameter which represents unobserved county-specific effects.
The random effects model maintains strict exogeneity of each error term, where
it and ui are orthogonal to Xit for all i and t.
cov(it, Xit) = 0 (28)
cov(ui, Xit) = 0 (29)
This is a rather restrictive assumption because it precludes any serial correlation in
the error term. A pooled Tobit model has the advantage of efficiency under serial cor-
relation and heteroskedasticity in the error term. A generalized method of moments
weighting matrix can be used to obtain efficient standard errors in the pooled model.
Correlation of the error term is a concern because the model includes a one period
lagged independent variable. A lagged variable may be an important component of
the data generating process. The number of solar installations in the previous pe-
riod captures spill-over effects across time periods. Including the lagged variable is a
potential cause for serial correlation in the error. This causes a violation of the ran-
dom effects assumption in Equation 28, whereby the random effects Tobit estimator
becomes biased and inconsistent.
Despite potential limitations, a random effects Tobit model does have the advan-
tage of exploiting unexplained county-specific heterogeneity in the data. The results
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can be useful to ascertain the sensitivity of parameter estimates across specifications.
Under the assumptions in Equations (26)-(29), the random effects model can be spec-
ified as
Yit = max[0, Xitβ + ui + it] (30)
The joint density function of Yi is written as
f(Yi|Xi, β, σ2 , ui) =
T∏
t=1
[
1
σ2
φ
(Yit − ui −Xitβ
σ2
)]dit[
1− Φ
(ui +Xitβ
σ2
)]1−dit
,
(31)
for the ith county in Yi = (Yi1, ..., YiT ). For maximum likelihood estimation of β, σ
2
 ,
and σ2u, the expression in Equation 31 is evaluated over all i. Thus the random effects
Tobit model maximizes the log-likelihood of
N∑
i=1
lnf(Yi|Xi, β, σ2 , σ2u) =
N∑
i=1
ln
∫
f(Yi|Xi, β, σ2 , ui)
1√
2piσ2u
exp
(−ui
2σ2u
)2
dui
(32)
This integral does not have a closed form solution. The log-likelihood can be approxi-
mated using Gaussian quadrature. Conditional expectations are obtained in a similar
fashion as the pooled expectations. It is convenient to express the latent variable as
Y ∗it = Xitβ + νit (33)
νit = ui + it (34)
νit ∼ N (0, σ2ν) (35)
where σν =
√
σu + σ. If the normality and orthogonality assumptions for ui and i
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are met, the process of obtaining the conditional expectation of Y follows Equations
(10)-(16), such that
E[Y |X, Y > 0] = Xβ + σν
[
φ(Xβ
σν
)
Φ(Xβ
σν
)
]
(36)
E[Y |X] = Φ
(Xβ
σν
)
Xβ + σνφ
(Xβ
σν
)
(37)
6.3.2 State fixed effects
While the random effects model attempts to incorporate panel-specific unobserved
heterogeneity, there may remain unobserved effects at the state level. The binary
state policy variables for rebates, property tax abatements, income tax credits and
loan programs are an apparent source of unobserved variation across state lines.
Different property and income tax rates will result in different net incentives where
tax incentives are available. Rebate amounts and loan program specifics also vary
significantly. In Massachusetts, rebates are awarded at a base rate of $0.40/watt of
solar capacity, plus additional rebate adders are available for in-state manufactured
components and moderate income consumers. New York has a $1.00/watt flat rate
rebate for residential solar PV systems.
In addition to unobserved differences due to the binary representation of some
state policies, there may be other state-specific effects which have not been addressed
by the explanatory variables. Therefore, state dummy variables are added to the
specification to capture unobserved heterogeneity at the state level. This is akin to
a state fixed effects specification, since the dummy variables are time-invariant. The
linear model of residential solar PV capacity becomes
Yit = α +Xitβ +Giγ +Kitκ+ Pitζ +Diδ + it (38)
where vector Di contains twelve dummy variables for the states represented in the
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sample. West Virginia is the excluded category being captured in the intercept.
6.4 Potential endogeneity issues
The use of policy variables as regressors can present endogeneity problems. States in
which a high proportion of residents who have positive attitudes towards addressing
environmental issues may be systematically more likely to provide greater renew-
able energy incentives. For example, a state regulator may be likely to implement
more stringent solar carve-out regulations if they believe that adoption response to
incentives is relatively elastic. A large contingent of early adopters and a burgeon-
ing pre-incentives residential solar PV market can be evidence of untapped demand.
Thus the level of incentives may be partially determined by the a priori trend in solar
PV adoption.
Another source of endogeneity may be the simultaneous systems of SREC prices
and solar PV capacity. More solar capacity enables greater generating potential,
which drives down the price of SRECs. Meanwhile, the price of SRECs directly
effects the amount of production incentive available to the individual solar power
producer, which may influence adoption decisions. This simultaneous relationship
causes problems for an empirical estimation of the parameters. Endogeneity causes
the explanatory variable, in this case the price of SRECs, to be correlated with the
error term of the regression, which causes parameter estimates to be biased and
inconsistent. The empirical malfunction can be illustrated as follows.
Yt = β1Xt + β2St + t
St = α1Xt + α2Yt + µt
Where Yt is a simplified model of residential solar PV demand and St is the current
SREC price. This is simultaneous system because each equation contains the other as
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a predictors. Xt is exogenous and µt is uncorrelated with t, such that E[Xt, t] = 0
and E[Zt, µt] = 0. Solving for St and evaluating the orthogonality condition,
St =
α1 + α2β1
1− β2α2 Xi +
1
1− β2α2µt +
α2
1− β2α2 t
E[Stt] =
α2
1− β2α2E[tt] 6= 0
Therefore, the orthogonality assumption is violated due to the simultaneity of SREC
prices. The model for solar PV demand will result in biased and inconsistent param-
eter estimates. An instrumental variable approach is needed to address the potential
for endogeneity bias in the empirical results.
6.4.1 Instrumental Variable Tobit estimator
Newey (1987) developed an efficient method for estimating a limited-dependent vari-
able model with endogenous regressors which can be applied to Tobit as well as
Probit models with simultaneous equations. The estimation process is analogous to
the generalized method of moments procedure for estimation of linear models with
endogenous regressors. In the solar PV adoption context the Tobit model with one
endogenous variable can be expressed as
Y ∗i = Xiβ + Siα + i (39)
Si = ZiΠ + µi (40)
where Y ∗i is the unobserved latent variable, X is a vector of exogenous regressors,
S contains the endogenous variable (SREC price), and Z is an vector of exogenous
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instruments. As before, solar PV adoption is observed such that
Yi =

0 if Y ∗i ≤ 0
Y ∗i if Y
∗
i > 0
(41)
The error terms are  and µ are distributed normally with zero mean. The co-
variance matrix is derived by specifying i = µ
′
iα+ νi, where νi ∼ N(0, σ2,µ) and νi is
independent of µi, Xi, and Zi. The resulting variance-covariance matrix is
Σ =
[
σ2 Σ
′
21
Σ21 Σ22
]
(42)
σ2,µ = σ
2
 − Σ
′
21Σ
−1
22 Σ21 (43)
The likelihood function for the endogenous variable is
lnf(Si|Zi) = −1
2
{
ln2pi + lnσ2µ +
(Si − ZiΠ)2
σ2µ
}
(44)
and the likelihood function for observed solar PV adoption is
lnf(Yi|Xi, Zi) =

ln
{
1− Φ( mi
σ,µ
)}
if Yi = 0
−1
2
{
ln2pi + lnσ2,µ +
(Yi−mi)2
σ2,µ
}
if Yi > 0
(45)
mi = Xiβ + α(Si − ZiΠ) (46)
Parameter estimates are obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function
lnLi = lnf(Yi|Xi, Zi) + lnf(Si|Zi) (47)
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6.5 Log-linear Tobit transformation
As shown by the expectations in Equations (14) and (16), the Tobit model relies
heavily on the assumption of normally distributed errors. However, it is unlikely that
the residual errors of the model will be normally distributed if the dependent variable
is highly non-normal. Table 2. presents detailed summary statistics of the dependent
variable in levels.
Table 2. Dependent variable summary statistics
PV capacity additions
Mean Median St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
286.993 26.047 864.133 8.703 121.837 0 17585.89
The dependent variable in levels is highly skewed and has excess positive kurtosis.
The median is very far below the mean, indicating a highly right skewed distribution.
Figure 9. is a density histogram of residential solar PV capacity additions in levels.
Figure 9. Histogram of capacity additions in levels
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It may be more appropriate to model solar PV adoption data as log-normal. A
special issue arises with the natural log transformation due to the corner solution
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nature of solar adoption data. Care must be taken to preserve the corner solution
structure of the data after the natural log transformation. Since the corner solution is
at zero in this data, the natural log transformation is undefined at the corner. Obser-
vations with values less than one are transformed to negative values, and observations
equal to unity are transformed to zero. A workaround is needed to recode the lower
limit of the distribution to a non-zero threshold. Undefined values after the natural
log transformation are recoded to be just below the smallest value of the transformed
dependent variable. Let w be the minimum of the dependent variable in levels, where
w > 0. The new corner solution value is thus defined as
γ = min[ln(w)]− α (48)
where α is an arbitrarily small value (0.000001). This is the procedure suggested by
Cameron and Trivedi (2010) to replicate the corner solution after the data has been
natural log transformed. Figure 10. is a histogram of the log-transformed depedent
variable after recoding observations at the corner solution. The corner-solution nature
of the data is preserved while values in the non-zero seem to be much closer to
normally distributed.
45
Figure 10. Histogram of ln(PV capacity additions)
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Table 3. presents detailed summary statistics of the log-transformed dependent
variable.
Table 3. Log-transformed dependent variable summary statistics
ln(PV capacity additions)
Mean Median St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
1.948 2.263 2.762 .1096 1.618 -1.204 8.916
Summary statistics show that ln(PV demand) has minimal non-normal kurtosis
and negligible skewness. This is a significant improvement over the distribution of
the dependent variable in levels. The Tobit model specification is restated with the
latent variable as
Y ∗ = exp(Xβ + ν) (49)
ν ∼ N (0, σ2ν) (50)
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where the observed values are defined by
Y =

Y ∗, if ln(Y ∗) > γ
0, if ln(Y ∗) ≤ γ
(51)
With a natural log transformed dependent variable the MLE parameter estimates
give the partial effects of the explantory variables on the log transformation of the
latent variable.
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CHAPTER 7
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter presents the empirical results from the models outlined above. Table
4. presents the pooled Tobit model results for the three specifications developed in
chapter 4, plus the state fixed effects specification discussed in section 6.3.2. Specifica-
tion (1) is the naive model of solar PV demand, specification (2) adds state financial
incentive and consumer support variables, specification (3) includes environmental
preference indicators, and specification (4) adds twelve state dummy variables. Pa-
rameter estimates for state dummy variables have been omitted from the tables in
this chapter. See Appendix C for the state dummy variable results.
Typically, Tobit model programs available in statistical software packages return
the marginal effects on the latent variable Y ∗. However, in a corner solution con-
text, these are not the marginal effects of interest. For the purposes of this paper
it is more appropriate to interpret the marginal effects on the observed dependent
variable rather than the uncensored latent variable. In addition, the marginal effects
of a change in the value of an explanatory variable are not constant in a nonlinear
model. Marginal effects will differ depending on the value at which the effect is evalu-
ated. Therefore, the marginal effects are evaluated for every value of the explanatory
variable in the sample, then averaged to obtain average marginal affects.
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Table 4. Pooled Tobit model estimation results
Dependent variable Specifications
ln(PV capacity additions) (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆(System count)t−1 0.00874∗∗∗ 0.00644∗∗∗ 0.00643∗∗∗ 0.00392∗∗∗
(8.32) (6.43) (6.34) (4.22)
Solar resource (kWh/m2/day) 0.918∗∗ 1.912∗∗∗ 1.664∗∗∗ 1.045∗∗
(3.11) (6.31) (5.22) (2.90)
ln(Owner-occupied homes) 0.561∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
(8.93) (10.89) (12.10) (12.01)
ln(Population density) -0.316∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗
(-6.15) (-8.66) (-9.18) (-8.00)
Electricity price (¢/kWh) 0.318∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.0426
(20.72) (9.89) (7.13) (1.07)
Bachelor degree or higher (%) 0.00580 0.0192∗∗∗ -0.00378 0.00110
(1.01) (3.59) (-0.57) (0.18)
Median Age -0.0812∗∗∗ -0.0628∗∗∗ -0.0508∗∗∗ -0.0271∗∗
(-5.61) (-4.63) (-3.61) (-2.15)
ln(Median home value) 1.078∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(7.08) (4.22) (4.67) (3.73)
Time trend 0.265∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗
(13.89) (7.72) (7.19) (7.22)
SREC Price ($) 0.00167∗∗∗ 0.00171∗∗∗ 0.00160∗∗∗
(5.17) (5.24) (5.00)
Sales tax exemption (%) 0.326∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(16.08) (17.00) (7.02)
Rebate (d) 0.499∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗
(4.86) (3.90) (2.40)
RPS trend 0.00295 0.00741 -0.253∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.46) (-3.64)
Income tax credit (d) 0.349∗∗ 0.446∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗
(2.41) (2.97) (3.64)
Property tax incentive (d) -1.592∗∗∗ -1.644∗∗∗ -2.355∗∗∗
(-8.17) (-8.31) (-8.70)
Loan program (d) 1.051∗∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗ 2.125∗∗∗
(7.92) (8.90) (9.96)
Solar rights (d) 0.0751 -0.0156 -0.873∗∗∗
(0.76) (-0.15) (-5.33)
Hybrid vehicle sales (%) 0.230∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(4.83) (7.11)
Democrats (%) 0.0127∗∗ 0.0133∗∗
(2.81) (3.11)
Organic consumers (%) 0.0229 -0.0109
(1.57) (-0.83)
Constant -38.58∗∗∗ -36.76∗∗∗ -38.51∗∗∗ -31.26∗∗∗
(-15.49) (-14.87) (-14.44) (-12.44)
σˆ 2.468
∗∗∗ 2.131∗∗∗ 2.106∗∗∗ 1.815∗∗∗
(46.53) (46.95) (47.01) (47.24)
Pseudo R2 0.201 0.258 0.262 0.315
Log-likelihood -3404.1 -3162.0 -3141.9 -2916.1
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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The table above and the following results tables in this chapter present the aver-
age marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the observed dependent variable,
given positive adoption E[ln(Yˆ )|X, Y > 0]. Each subsequent specification represents
an improvement to the model. The log-likelihood and pseudo R2 indicators of fit
increase with each subsequent specification. Likelihood ratio tests are performed to
formally confirm that each subsequent specification presents a statistically significant
improvement. Let θˆr be the parameter vector that maximizes the log-likelihood func-
tion subject to the restricted model. For each comparison, the restricted model is the
one with fewer regressors. θˆu is the parameter vector that maximizes the unrestricted
log-likelihood. The LR test statistic is
LR = −2[lnL(θˆr)− lnL(θˆu)] (52)
The LR test statistic follows a χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the
difference in the number of regressors between the restricted and unrestricted model.
Table 5. provides the results of three likelihood-ratio tests between subsequent speci-
fications. Each LR test provides strong statistical evidence of improvements to model
Table 5. Likelihood ratio tests
Specifications
(1) vs. (2) (2) vs. (3) (3) vs. (4)
Degrees of Freedom (df) 9 3 12
LR 591.51 41.24 500.14
Pr{χ20.05(df)>LR} 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
fit. Large LR test statistics and p-values very close to zero indicate strong rejection of
the null hypothesis that the unrestricted and restricted models preform equally well.
There is strong evidence that each subsequent specification is a better approximation
of the data generating process for residential solar PV capacity additions.
The addition of important explanatory variables in each subsequent specification
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reveal significant corrections of omitted variable bias. Omitted variable bias arises
when a significant explanatory variable is omitted from the specification. When an
important regressors is omitted, it’s effect on the dependent variable is subsumed in
the error term, which violates the orthogonality assumption between the explanatory
variables Xit and the error term it, E[Xit|it] = 0. This assumption holds only in the
unlikely case when the omitted variable is uncorrelated with any of the explanatory
variables in Xit. If the omitted variable is correlated with the included regressors,
parameter estimates obtained from the restricted specification will be biased.
Corrections of omitted variable bias are evident through changes in parameter
estimates as important explanatory variables are introduced. The estimated effect
of the number of previous-year residential installations is reduced in specification
(2). With the inclusion of state fixed effects in the final specification, the effect of
previous-year installations is reduced two-fold from specification (1). The estimated
effect of solar insolation roughly doubles in magnitude when state policy variables are
introduced, then falls slightly under state fixed effects.
The parameter estimate for electricity price effects experiences close to a five-fold
drop in magnitude and loses statistical significance between specifications (1) and (4).
However, the loss of explanatory power in the electricity price variable may be due
to a data limitation rather than a reflection of the true data generating process. The
electricity price variable is the only regressors which is limited to a cross-section of
average state electricity prices. This data limitation is due to a lack of reliable data for
county-level electricity prices over time. Variability in electricity prices over time is
not captured, while differences in electricity prices among states are subsumed by the
state dummy variables in specification (4). The loss of significance for electricity price
effects should be interpreted with caution. High statistical significance and positive
electricity price effects in the first three specifications point to the importance of
considering electricity prices for estimating residential solar PV demand.
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The estimated effects of educational attainment fluctuate in magnitude and sta-
tistical significance. Including state policy variables causes the education variable to
gain significance and substantially increases the magnitude of the estimate. In spec-
ification (3), which adds environmental preference indicators, the education variable
loses significance and changes sign. These large shifts may be due in part to high
correlations between the education variable and the environmental preference indica-
tors. Table 6. shows that the education variable has a highest correlation coefficient
with the percentage of organic consumers.
Table 6. Cross-correlations
Variables Education Hybrids Democrats Organics
Education 1.000
Hybrids 0.628 1.000
Democrats 0.620 0.468 1.000
Organics 0.791 0.451 0.591 1.000
This is evidence that the organic consumers variable may be an erroneous explana-
tory variable. Likelihood-ratio tests are used to confirm that the organic consumers
variable can be omitted from the specifications. Table 7. presents likelihood-ratio
tests for specifications (3) and (4), with the restricted model omitting the organic
consumption variable in each each. Under specification (3) the LR test cannot reject
Table 7. Likelihood ratio tests for organics variable
Specifications
(3) (4)
Degrees of Freedom (df) 1 1
LR 0.00 5.81
Pr{χ20.05(df)>LR} 0.9746 0.0160
the null hypothesis that the model is equally powerful with and without the organic
consumers variable. The same LR test under specification (4) fails to reject the null
at a 1% significance level. While estimated coefficient does appear to be significant
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at the 10% level in the state fixed effect specification, the negative sign is opposite
of expected. The results of the LR tests, incorrect sign, and high correlation coeffi-
cient with education variable provides sufficient evidence to conclude that the organic
consumers variable can be excluded from the model.
Continuing down the list of results, the negative parameter estimate for median
age falls in absolute value with each subsequents specification. The positive median
home value effect drops by about half after the naive model, remaining statistically
significant at 1% throughout. The estimated time trend effect dips down after the
naive model, then increases under state fixed effects. Changes in the estimated ef-
fects of several policy variables are most apparent between specifications (3) and (4).
The estimated effect of rebates decreases in magnitude and loses some significance,
remaining statistically different from zero at the 5% level. Estimated loan program
effects are bumped up and remain significant. The income tax credit effect increases
five-fold in magnitude and gains significance. The most dramatic shifts are witnessed
by the the solar rights and RPS trend variables. The estimated effect of a solar rights
policy switches sign from positive to negative, increases tenfold in absolute value,
and becomes statistically significant at a 1% significance level. The RPS trend effect
also becomes negative, dramatically increases in absolute value and gains statistical
significance. Clearly, the state dummy variables are picking up significant variation
in state policies which is not well represented by the binary policy variables alone.
Parameter estimates for several variables remain relatively consistent in magni-
tude and statistical significance across specifications. The owner-occupied households
control variable remains significant at 1% and positive. The population density effect
is statistically robust and negative with small fluctuations in magnitude. Notably,
sales tax exemption is the only state policy variable with a consistent parameter es-
timate between specifications (3) and (4). The sales tax variable is not binary; it
already contains differences in the sales tax rates across state lines, thus it makes
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sense that including state effects does not change the sales tax exemption results.
With the exception of the organic consumers variable, the estimated effects of
environmental preference indicators are positive and robust to specification. Demo-
cratic party affiliation effects remain significant at 5% and the magnitude is almost
unchanged between specifications (3) and (4). The positive effect of hybrid vehicle
demand increases slightly in magnitude and remains significant at 1%.
7.1 Panel-robust pooled Tobit estimator
The panel Tobit estimator from the which the above results were derived estimates
the data in one large cross-section. However, it is likely that the assumption of ho-
moskedasticity of the errors is violated due to correlation within panels ,i.e., errors
from observations within the same county may be correlated. Non-independence of
the errors causes the calculated standard errors to be wrong. Incorrect standard errors
invalidate hypothesis tests and may lead to erroneous conclusions of significance. As
with other non-linear maximum likelihood estimation procedures, heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors can be computed for the Tobit model using White (1980)
generalized method of moments procedure. The distinct variances σ2i can be esti-
mated with σˆ2i = uˆ
2
i , where uˆ
2
i are the linear estimated residuals (errors) squared.
The squared residuals are used as weights in the covariance matrix Ω, which can be
consistently estimated by
Ωˆn =
( 1
n
∑
i
XiX
′
i
)−1( 1
n
∑
i
XiX
′
i uˆ
2
i
)( 1
n
∑
i
XiX
′
i
)−1
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In a panel data context this procedure is extended to assume that errors are un-
correlated across groups and that the source of heteroskedasticity is within-group
correlation. In the literature this is often referred to as a ”sandwich variance estima-
tor” which adjusts the covariance matrix for error ”clusters” within groups. Table
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8. reports the standard errors and t-statistics for specification (4) before and after
clustering.
Table 8. Panel-robust standard errors
Dependent variable Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit
ln(PV demand) Panel-robust St. Err.
∆(System count)t−1 (4.2248)*** (3.0366)**
[0.0009] [0.0013]
Solar resource (kWh/m2/day) (2.8497)** (2.0543)**
[0.3591] [0.4981]
ln(Owner-occupied homes) (12.0450)*** (4.8470)***
[0.0578] [0.1437]
ln(Population density) (-8.1216)*** (-5.1369)***
[0.0515] [0.0814]
Electricity price (¢/kWh) (1.0719) (1.1386)
[0.0397] [0.0374]
Bachelor degree or higher (%) (-0.0444) (-0.0291)
[0.0058] [0.0088]
Median Age (-2.0970)** (-1.7931)+
[0.0126] [0.0147]
ln(Median home value) (3.6349)*** (2.3332)**
[0.1433] [0.2233]
Time trend (7.2097)*** (6.9209)***
[0.0695] [0.0724]
SREC Price ($) (5.0123)*** (5.4098)***
[0.0003] [0.0003]
Sales tax exemption (%) (7.0194)*** (3.6912)***
[0.0443] [0.0843]
Rebate (d) (2.4027)** (2.8837)**
[0.1280] [0.1066]
RPS trend (-3.6313)*** (-3.4833)***
[0.0695] [0.0725]
Income tax credit (d) (3.6506)*** (2.8597)**
[0.4233] [0.5404]
Property tax incentive (d) (-8.6993)*** (-5.9234)***
[0.2708] [0.3976]
Loan program (d) (9.9521)*** (7.5360)***
[0.2133] [0.2817]
Solar rights (d) (-5.3331)*** (-4.3644)***
[0.1639] [0.2003]
Hybrid vehicle sales (%) (7.2202)*** (5.0816)***
[0.0440] [0.0626]
Democrats (%) (3.0160)** (2.7903)**
[0.0042] [0.0046]
Constant (-12.4518)*** (-5.2058)***
[2.4861] [5.9465]
σˆ (47.2374)*** (18.8733)***
[0.0384] [0.0962]
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors in square brackets
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Note that parameter estimates are not displayed in Table 8.. The robust vari-
ance matrix is calculated after the fact of maximizing the log-likelihood function,
so that parameter estimates remain unchanged after correcting the standard errors.
The robust standard errors are consistent under heteroskedasticity, while parameter
estimates obtained from the Tobit model remain biased and inconsistent under non-
constant error variance. This is a limitation of the Tobit model which is discussed
further in chapter 8.
The panel-robust standard error estimator results in some large reductions in the
t-statistics. The t-statistics for owner-occupied housing and the constant term fall
from double to single-digit values. Notable differences are also witnessed by the t-
statistics for the effects of sales tax exemptions and hybrid vehicle sales. The most
dramatic difference is in the t-statistic for σˆ, falling from 47.24 to 18.87. Large
reductions in t-statistics indicate that the standard errors may have been wrong in
the homoskedastic variance-covariance matrix estimated by the pooled Tobit model.
These results point to heteroskedasticity due to correlation within panels.
However, despite potential issues with heteroskedasticity, statistical significance
of the results is robust. There are few changes to statistical significance between the
homoskedastic and panel-robust covariance matrix. Previous year solar installations,
income tax credit and median home value drop in significance from the 1% to the 5%
level. The largest reduction is statistical significance is witnessed by the estimated
effect of median age, which becomes not significantly different from zero for a two-
tailed hypothesis test.
7.2 Random effects Tobit estimator results
Another potential source of heterogeneity which has not been addressed in the pooled
Tobit results is the county-specific, time-invariant effect on residential solar PV adop-
tion. The random effects Tobit model does not support a White-type heteroskedasticity-
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robust variance estimator. Bootstrapped standard errors are obtained instead. Boos-
trapping is a process of resampling the data by taking random samples with replace-
ment from the original sample data. The sampling distribution of the parameter
estimates is then constructed from the resamples, which is then used to calculate
the sample standard deviation of the sampling distribution. Table 9. presents results
from the random effects Tobit model with and without bootstrapped errors. The
state fixed effects specification (excluding the organic consumers variable) is com-
pared between the pooled Tobit model with panel-robust standard errors and the
random effects Tobit models.
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Table 9. Random effects Tobit estimator parameter estimates
Pooled Tobit RE Tobit RE Tobit
Robust St. Err. Bootstrap St. Err.
∆(System count)t−1 0.00392∗∗ 0.00205∗∗ 0.00205+
(3.04) (2.28) (1.91)
Solar resource (kWh/m2/day) 1.023∗∗ 1.537∗∗ 1.537∗∗
(2.05) (2.95) (2.71)
ln(Owner-occupied homes) 0.697∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗
(4.85) (8.87) (4.80)
ln(Population density) -0.418∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗
(-5.14) (-5.82) (-4.85)
Electricity price (¢/kWh) 0.0426 0.0447 0.0447
(1.14) (1.26) (1.39)
Bachelor degree or higher (%) -0.000257 0.00582 0.00582
(-0.03) (0.72) (0.60)
Median Age -0.0264+ -0.0273 -0.0273+
(-1.79) (-1.54) (-1.71)
ln(Median home value) 0.521∗∗ 0.543∗∗ 0.543∗∗
(2.33) (2.67) (2.41)
Time trend 0.501∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗
(6.92) (8.15) (6.24)
SREC Price ($) 0.00160∗∗∗ 0.00156∗∗∗ 0.00156∗∗∗
(5.41) (5.47) (5.69)
Sales tax exemption (%) 0.311∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(3.69) (8.11) (3.95)
Rebate (d) 0.307∗∗ 0.237∗∗ 0.237∗∗
(2.88) (2.07) (1.98)
RPS trend -0.252∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗
(-3.48) (-3.83) (-3.42)
Income tax credit (d) 1.545∗∗ 1.575∗∗∗ 1.575∗∗
(2.86) (4.15) (2.69)
Property tax incentive (d) -2.355∗∗∗ -2.360∗∗∗ -2.360∗∗∗
(-5.92) (-9.75) (-6.49)
Loan program (d) 2.123∗∗∗ 2.181∗∗∗ 2.181∗∗∗
(7.54) (11.19) (9.70)
Solar rights (d) -0.874∗∗∗ -0.863∗∗∗ -0.863∗∗∗
(-4.36) (-5.81) (-4.91)
Hybrid vehicle sales (%) 0.318∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗
(5.08) (3.91) (2.69)
Democrats (%) 0.0128∗∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0133∗∗
(2.79) (2.09) (2.21)
Constant -30.96∗∗∗ -35.72∗∗∗ -35.72∗∗∗
(-5.21) (-9.74) (-7.24)
σˆu 0.890
∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗
(12.13) (4.44)
σˆ 1.815
∗∗∗ 1.607∗∗∗ 1.607∗∗∗
(47.24) (43.32) (26.88)
Log-likelihood -2916.5 -2865.8 -2865.8
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
There are several notable changes to parameter estimates between the pooled
58
Tobit and RE Tobit estimators. The estimated effect of the number of previous year
installations falls in magnitude and loses statistical significance after bootstrapping.
The education effect takes on the expected sign (positive) and increases in magnitude,
although it does not become statistically significant. Median age loses statistical
significance and then gains it back after bootstrapping. The estimated coefficient for
hybrid vehicle sales falls in magnitude while changing statistical significance from the
1% level to the 5% level after bootstrapping.
All other results are robust between the pooled and RE Tobit estimators. Solar
resource abundance, the number of owner-occupied housing units, electricity prices
and the time trend have consistently positive and significant effects. The median age
effect is consistent in magnitude and borders on statistical significance at the 10%
level. SREC prices, sales tax exemption, income tax credit, rebates and loan programs
remain positive and significant policy effects. The estimated effect of democratic party
affiliation remains positive and significant at the 5% significance level in a right-tailed
hypothesis test. The negative estimated effects of population density, RPS trend and
property tax incentives and solar rights policies remain robust across estimators.
The random effects estimator with bootstrapped standard errors reveals several
significant differences in the estimated standard errors. The t-statistics for the esti-
mated effects of sales tax exemption, property tax incentive and loan program decline
substantially. This is an interesting result because this pattern emerges only in vari-
ables which represent state policy effect. It is unclear why this this pattern emerges.
However, despite apparent differences in the estimated standard errors, there are no
changes to levels of statistical significance between the RE model with and without
bootstrapping.
The estimated variance of the time-invariant county-specific effect σˆu is significant
at the 1% level. The standard error of the general error σˆ is slashed in half after
bootstrapping. The same pattern emerged when panel-robust standard errors were
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used for the pooled Tobit estimator. In comparing the results of the pooled and RE
Tobit models, the main conclusions drawn from the estimated marginal effects will
be largely similar. The random effects Tobit estimator only slightly increases the
log-likelihood of the model.
7.3 Instrumental variable Tobit estimator results
An instrumental variable (IV) Tobit estimator is used to address potential endogeneity
issues. Specifically, endogeneity is suspected to arise due to the simultaneous nature of
SREC markets and solar PV adoption. The IV Tobit model is akin to a pooled Tobit
model in that it does not incorporate individual-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity,
so results are best compared with the pooled Tobit model to identify endogeneity-
induced differences. Table 10. presents a comparison of parameter estimates between
the exogenous pooled Tobit estimator and the IV Tobit estimator with and without
panel-robust standard errors.
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Table 10. IV Tobit Results
Pooled Tobit IV Tobit IV Tobit
Robust St. Err. Robust St. Err.
∆(System count)t−1 0.00392∗∗ 0.00458∗∗∗ 0.00458∗∗∗
(3.04) (4.76) (3.55)
Solar resource (kWh/m2/day) 1.023∗∗ 1.145∗∗ 1.145∗∗
(2.05) (3.07) (2.25)
ln(Owner-occupied homes) 0.697∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗
(4.85) (11.33) (4.64)
ln(Population density) -0.418∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗
(-5.14) (-7.73) (-4.96)
Electricity price (¢/kWh) 0.0426 0.0865∗∗ 0.0865∗∗
(1.14) (2.04) (2.20)
Bachelor degree or higher (%) -0.000257 -0.000648 -0.000648
(-0.03) (-0.11) (-0.07)
Median Age -0.0264+ -0.0250+ -0.0250
(-1.79) (-1.92) (-1.64)
ln(Median home value) 0.521∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗
(2.33) (3.32) (2.13)
Time trend 0.501∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗
(6.92) (6.55) (8.73)
SREC Price ($) 0.00160∗∗∗ 0.00252∗∗∗ 0.00252∗∗∗
(5.41) (3.51) (4.61)
Sales tax exemption (%) 0.311∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗
(3.69) (6.01) (3.22)
Rebate (d) 0.307∗∗ 0.243+ 0.243∗∗
(2.88) (1.77) (2.27)
RPS trend -0.252∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗
(-3.48) (-3.42) (-4.53)
Income tax credit (d) 1.545∗∗ 1.817∗∗∗ 1.817∗∗
(2.86) (4.17) (3.23)
Property tax incentive (d) -2.355∗∗∗ -2.838∗∗∗ -2.838∗∗∗
(-5.92) (-7.53) (-6.58)
Loan program (d) 2.123∗∗∗ 2.060∗∗∗ 2.060∗∗∗
(7.54) (8.57) (6.81)
Solar rights (d) -0.874∗∗∗ -1.008∗∗∗ -1.008∗∗∗
(-4.36) (-5.90) (-5.02)
Hybrid vehicle sales (%) 0.318∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(5.08) (7.27) (5.05)
Democrats (%) 0.0128∗∗ 0.0126∗∗ 0.0126∗∗
(2.79) (2.86) (2.56)
Observations 2014 1911 1911
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
A Hausman specification test is conducted to test whether the IV Tobit model
is a necessary improvement over the exogenous pooled Tobit model. Under the null
hypothesis, the parameter estimates are consistent under both pooled and IV mod-
els. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the parameter estimates are inconsistent under
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the pooled model and the IV parameter estimates should be used. Under the null
hypothesis, the non-IV pooled estimator should be used because is it consistent and
more efficient than the IV estimator. Under a χ2 distribution with 30 degrees of
freedom the Hausman test statistic is 51.84 with a p-value of 0.004. The null hypoth-
esis is rejected at the 5% significance level, indicating that the pooled estimator is
inconsistent and that the IV Tobit estimator is preferred for making inferences.
The results from the IV specification are largely similar to the results from the
pooled Tobit estimator. Note that the sample size has been slightly reduced due to
missing data for the lagged SREC price instrument. SREC prices remain positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level, although the magnitude of the estimated
effect nearly doubles. The most notable difference is that the effect of electricity prices
doubles in magnitude and gains statistical significance. A right-tailed hypothesis
tests concludes that the effect of electricity prices is positive at the 5% significance
level. It is possible that the estimate for electricity price effects was biased due to
simultaneous-equation issues, and that this bias was corrected in by the IV estimator.
The result is consistent with expectations that electricity prices play a role in solar
PV demand because they determine the cost reductions a solar-enabled household
will expect to accrue.
Table 11. presents the first stage IV regression in which the SREC price variable is
instrumented by the all other explanatory variables in the solar PV adoption model,
plus previous-period SREC prices and SACP prices.
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Table 11. IV Tobit first stage
Dependent variable IV Tobit IV Tobit
SREC Price ($) Robust St. Err.
SACP (%) 0.301∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
(19.17) (9.32)
(SREC Price)t−1 0.195∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(9.47) (11.78)
∆(System count)t−1 -0.481∗∗∗ -0.481∗∗∗
(-8.37) (-4.59)
Solar resource (kWh/m2/day) 1.443 1.443
(0.07) (0.18)
ln(Owner-occupied homes) 6.021+ 6.021+
(1.79) (1.87)
ln(Population density) -3.377 -3.377∗∗
(-1.16) (-2.44)
Electricity price (¢/kWh) -8.165∗∗∗ -8.165∗∗
(-3.43) (-2.10)
Bachelor degree or higher (%) 0.130 0.130
(0.39) (0.66)
Median Age 0.419 0.419
(0.59) (1.19)
ln(Median home value) 0.750 0.750
(0.09) (0.14)
Time trend 0.156 0.156
(0.05) (0.06)
Sales tax exemption (%) -8.675∗∗ -8.675+
(-3.19) (-1.83)
Rebate (d) 66.98∗∗∗ 66.98∗∗∗
(8.77) (7.07)
RPS trend -15.95∗∗∗ -15.95∗∗∗
(-5.02) (-5.45)
Income tax credit (d) -17.49 -17.49
(-0.78) (-1.09)
Property tax incentive (d) 282.1∗∗∗ 282.1∗∗∗
(19.36) (11.91)
Loan program (d) 69.32∗∗∗ 69.32∗∗∗
(6.85) (6.38)
Solar rights (d) 38.11∗∗∗ 38.11∗∗∗
(4.42) (7.57)
Hybrid vehicle sales (%) 3.657 3.657
(1.40) (1.56)
Democrats (%) 0.155 0.155
(0.64) (1.19)
Constant -24.29 -24.29
(-0.27) (-0.45)
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Two excluded instruments are used in estimating SREC prices in the first stage:
previous-year average SREC prices and the current-year solar alternative compliance
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payment (SACP). The SACP is a convenient instrument for SREC prices because it
reflects the price ceiling which also serves as the driver of demand for SRECs. Since
the SACP schedule is set by legislation a prior I can be confident that the SACP
variable will be exogenous in the solar PV demand function.
Previous-year average SREC prices are included as an additional instrument be-
cause the SACP instrument alone did not achieve exogeneity based on results from a
Smith-Blundell test. The Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity tests whether the resid-
uals from the first stage regression have explanatory power in the model. Under the
null hypothesis of exogeneity these residuals should have no explanatory power (Smith
and Blundell 1986). After including previous year SREC prices as an additional in-
strument, the Smith-Blundell test results in an F-statistic of 2.201 with a p-value of
.1381, failing to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity in the IV Tobit estimator.
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CHAPTER 8
LIMITATIONS
The empirical analysis presented in this thesis is subject to several data limitations.
Census data for median home value, median age, education level, population size,
and number of owner-occupied households is subject to sampling error. Local-level
incentives for residential solar adoption as well as awareness programs and marketing
are not observed. The variables measuring Democratic party affiliation, household
consumption of organic goods, solar insolation and electricity prices are time-invariant
due to limited data sources. It is possible that important inter-temporal effects of
these variables are being left out. Finally, the sample of Northeastern states may not
be representative of the data generating process for residential solar adoption across
the United States. Economic conditions, demographics and electricity markets vary
greatly between different regions in the U.S., so it may be unwise to apply the findings
here to the entire U.S. solar market.
8.1 Tobit estimator consistency
The Tobit estimator relies on heteroskedastic and normally distributed errors for con-
sistency. If the variance of the latent variable error is not constant across observations,
or if the errors are not normally distributed with a zero mean, the parameter esti-
mates obtained from the maximum likelihood Tobit estimator may be inconsistent.
Cameron and Trivedi (2010) develop a test for heteroskedasticity and non-normality of
the Tobit residuals. The tests entail generating generalized residuals. For observations
above the censoring point, the Tobit residuals are obtained by ˆi = (Yi−X ′i βˆ)/σˆ. For
observations at the censoring point the residuals are obtained using sample analogs
of moment conditions presented in Table 12..
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Table 12. Error moments at censoring point
Moments Quantities
E(i|di = 0) −λi
E(2i |di = 0) 1− ziλi
E(3i |di = 0) −(2 + z2i )λi
E(4i |di = 0) 3− (3zi + z3i )λi
Adapted from Cameron and Trivedi (2010), page 550.
Where di is a binary variable indicating solar adoption, λi =
φ(X
′
iβ/σ)
1−Φ(X′iβ/σ)
, and
zi = (−X ′iβ)/σ. The generalized residuals are tested for normality and heteroskedas-
ticity with a Lagrange multiplier (LM) score test. The procedure for obtaining the
likelihood scores and calculating the LM test statistic is outlined in Cameron and
Trivedi (2010), section 16.4.6. The tests are applied to results form the pooled Tobit
and RE Tobit estimators. Table 13. presents the results of the LM tests for normality
and heteroskedasticity.
Table 13. LM tests of normality and heteroskedasticity
LM test statistic
Ho Pooled Tobit RE Tobit
Normality 1051.706 962.699
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Homoskedasticity 1131.459 1025.082
(0.0000) (0.0000)
p-values in parentheses
The LM tests for both models strongly reject the null hypotheses of normally
distributed and homoskedastic errors. The Tobit model is known to be inconsistent
when the assumptions on the error term are violated. Despite this limitation, the
results presented in this thesis may still be informative to regulators and policy mak-
ers. As an approximation of the sensitivity of the results, a final comparison is made
between the various versions of the Tobit estimator and a generalized least squares
(GLS) linear regression. The GLS estimator uses a linear specification of residen-
66
tial solar PV demand, with panel-robust standard errors computed using the White
(1980) “sandwich” clustering procedure. All models in Table 14. employ panel-level
standard error adjustments.
Table 14. Comparison of empirical results
Pooled Tobit RE Tobit IV Tobit GLS
Robust SE Bootstrap SE Robust SE Robust SE
∆(System count)t−1 0.00392∗∗ 0.00205+ 0.00458∗∗∗ 0.00854∗∗∗
(3.04) (1.91) (3.55) (4.91)
Solar resource (kWh/m2/day) 1.023∗∗ 1.537∗∗ 1.145∗∗ 0.911+
(2.05) (2.71) (2.25) (1.95)
ln(Owner-occupied homes) 0.697∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗
(4.85) (4.80) (4.64) (5.13)
ln(Population density) -0.418∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
(-5.14) (-4.85) (-4.96) (-5.14)
Electricity price (¢/kWh) 0.0426 0.0447 0.0865∗∗ 0.0664
(1.14) (1.39) (2.20) (1.56)
Bachelor degree or higher (%) -0.000257 0.00582 -0.000648 0.00308
(-0.03) (0.60) (-0.07) (0.33)
Median Age -0.0264+ -0.0273+ -0.0250 -0.0113
(-1.79) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-0.71)
ln(Median home value) 0.521∗∗ 0.543∗∗ 0.494∗∗ 0.455+
(2.33) (2.41) (2.13) (1.90)
Time trend 0.501∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(6.92) (6.24) (8.73) (5.69)
SREC Price ($) 0.00160∗∗∗ 0.00156∗∗∗ 0.00252∗∗∗ 0.00252∗∗∗
(5.41) (5.69) (4.61) (6.37)
Sales tax exemption (%) 0.311∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(3.69) (3.95) (3.22) (4.13)
Rebate (d) 0.307∗∗ 0.237∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗
(2.88) (1.98) (2.27) (4.40)
RPS trend -0.252∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.00608
(-3.48) (-3.42) (-4.53) (-0.11)
Income tax credit (d) 1.545∗∗ 1.575∗∗ 1.817∗∗ 1.018∗∗
(2.86) (2.69) (3.23) (2.72)
Property tax incentive (d) -2.355∗∗∗ -2.360∗∗∗ -2.838∗∗∗ -1.846∗∗∗
(-5.92) (-6.49) (-6.58) (-5.62)
Loan program (d) 2.123∗∗∗ 2.181∗∗∗ 2.060∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗
(7.54) (9.70) (6.81) (3.10)
Solar rights (d) -0.874∗∗∗ -0.863∗∗∗ -1.008∗∗∗ -0.678∗∗∗
(-4.36) (-4.91) (-5.02) (-4.66)
Hybrid vehicle sales (%) 0.318∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(5.08) (2.69) (5.05) (5.17)
Democrats (%) 0.0128∗∗ 0.0133∗∗ 0.0126∗∗ 0.0154∗∗
(2.79) (2.21) (2.56) (3.24)
Constant -30.96∗∗∗ -35.72∗∗∗ -31.19∗∗∗ -17.97∗∗∗
(-5.21) (-7.24) (-5.20) (-4.20)
Observations 2014 2014 1911 2014
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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While the linear model is known to be biased due to the corner solution in the
dependent variable, it can be informative to see which results remain robust to the
choice of estimator. The largest differences across estimators are witnessed by the
estimated effects of previous-year system counts, electricity prices, education, and
the RPS trend variable. The estimated effect of previous-year installations is roughly
doubled going from a Tobit to a GLS estimator. Electricity prices are statistically
significant only under the IV Tobit estimator. The magnitude of the education level
effect changes between positive and negative values while remaining not statistically
different from zero. The RPS trend effect has the most dramatic difference between
the maximum-likelihood Tobit estimators and a linear GLS estimator. It goes from
being strongly statistically significant at 1% to not significantly different from zero,
while the magnitude decreases almost to zero.
Despite some econometric limitations of the Tobit estimator, I am confident that
the results can be used to make inferences. I use two informal tests to ascertain the
reliability of the results. Firstly, standard error corrections do not results in substan-
tial changes to statistical significance. This is an indication that the magnitude of
heteroskedasticity is not a serious cause for concern. If the heteroskedasticity were
substantial I would see large swings in the standard errors. Secondly, the parameter
estimates are largely robust to model specification. Differences between the Tobit
estimates and the linear GLS estimates are expected due to the corner solutions in
the data.
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CHAPTER 9
PREFERRED SPECIFICATION AND MARGINAL EFFECTS
The instrumental variable Tobit estimator is the preferred estimation method because
it addresses the endogeneity of SREC prices. A Hausman test formally shows that
the instrumental variable estimator is the only consistent estimator. The choice of
which estimator to use for the final interpretation is an important one, since the main
objective of this study is to accurately assess the relative impacts of state policies on
demand. It is this author’s view that the most reliable results are obtained by the
instrumental variable Tobit estimator. This section will present the final specification
which will be interpreted to obtain policy implications and suggestions.
Two final specification adjustments are applied before the final results are in-
terpreted. First, the state fixed effects are dropped. While the state dummies did
improve the overall predictive power of the model, they were problematic for the indi-
vidual coefficient estimates. This is because the state dummies were highly correlated
with the other explanatory variables, especially the state policy variables. The state
dummies may have been “sucking up” all inter-state variation from the policy vari-
ables. Since the panel analyzed is relatively short (8 years), there may too few policy
changes witnessed within states over this period to justify an intra-state examination
of policy effects.
As a formal test of the collinearity issue in the state dummy variables, variance
inflation factors (VIFs) are calculated after a linear regression. Seven out of the
twelve state dummy variables have VIFs of 20 and greater. This a clear red flag
that multicollinearity is a cause for concern. With high degrees of multicollinearity,
the parameter estimates, as well as significance levels, may be skewed and sensitive.
As a follow-up, the specification was run on different sub-samples of the dataset.
Excluding a single state or shortening the time series resulted in wide swings in the
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parameter estimates. Based on mounting evidence of a problem with the state dummy
variables, the choice was made to exclude the state fixed effects from the specification.
An unforeseen consequence of this exclusion was that the IV estimator now failed the
Wald test of exogeneity. This was solved by including a binary variable that captures
a solar carve-out as an additional instrument for SREC prices. With this additional
instrument the Wald test failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity in the IV
Tobit estimator.
The property tax exemption variable is also dropped from the final specification.
Recall that the property tax variable has an unexpected large negative coefficient
estimate which is statistically significant. After closer inspection, it becomes clear
that the unexpected result is driven by a data issue rather than being reflective of the
true effect of a property tax incentive. Correlation coefficients upwards of .8 between
the property tax variable and other state policies indicate high degrees of collinearity.
A simple linear regression of property tax regressed on solar capacity indicates the
expected positive relationship.
Furthermore, the property tax variable is very limited in variation over time. Only
three states in the sample experienced property tax policy changes within the study
period. This is too small a sample from which the effect of a property tax incentive can
be gleaned. Several states, including Vermont and Pennsylvania, have no property
tax incentive throughout the study period, yet they experience large spurts of growth
in solar PV adoption. The model may be associating positive growth in PV demand
with the lack of a property tax incentive, causing a spurious negative estimated effect
for the property tax incentive variable. I proceed by excluding the property tax
variable because of a lack of inter-temporal variation and high collinearity with the
other state policy variables. A longer panel, in which more policy changes over time
are witnessed within each state, is needed to evaluate the effect of a property tax
incentive.
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The results for the preferred specification begin with demographics and geographic
characteristics in Table 15.. For the these variables, the marginal effects are evaluated
at the sample means 7. Four versions of marginal effects are presented: the marginal
effect on the latent variable, βˆ = ∂E[Y ∗]/∂X; the marginal effect on total capacity
additions, ∂E[Y ]/∂X; the marginal effect on capacity additions, given that there is
positive adoption, ∂E[Y |Y > 0]/∂X; and the marginal effect on the probability of
positive adoption, ∂P (Y > 0)/∂X. Parameter estimates which are not statistically
different from zero are not evaluated.
Table 15. Marginal effects at means: demographics and geography
Unit change (1) (2) (3) (4)
in βˆ ∂E[lnYˆ ]/∂X ∂E[lnYˆ |Y > 0]/∂X ∂P (Yˆ > 0)/∂X
∆(System count)t−1 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.00935∗∗∗ 0.00718∗∗∗ 0.00104∗∗∗
(3.81) (3.87) (3.91) (3.45)
Solar resource (kWh/m2/day) 2.109∗∗ 1.840∗∗ 1.415∗∗ 0.205∗∗
(2.83) (2.82) (2.81) (2.83)
Electricity price (¢/kWh) 0.242∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗
(3.65) (3.68) (3.70) (3.42)
Bachelor degree or higher (%) -0.00563 -0.00492 -0.00378 -0.000548
(-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.35)
Median Age -0.0845∗∗ -0.0737∗∗ -0.0567∗∗ -0.00821∗∗
(-2.43) (-2.44) (-2.46) (-2.31)
Time trend 0.191∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.0185∗∗
(2.87) (2.85) (2.82) (2.95)
Elasticities
ln(Owner-occupied homes) 1.119∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(4.55) (4.49) (4.43) (4.62)
ln(Population density) -0.756∗∗∗ -0.659∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗ -0.0734∗∗∗
(-4.80) (-4.75) (-4.70) (-4.75)
ln(Median home value) 1.287∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(3.55) (3.50) (3.46) (3.65)
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The largest change comes about from a one-unit change in solar resource. An
additional kilowatt-hour per meter squared per day is expected to increase residential
PV capacity by 125%. This helps to explain the wide discrepancy in adoption between
states like California and New Jersey. Both states have aggressive incentives, while
average solar resource in California exceeds New Jersey by 2-3 kWh across the state.
7See table 1.
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The time trend indicates that with each year, hold all else constant and with zero
incentives, residential PV capacity is expected to grow by 57%. The expected effect
of a one cent increase in the electricity price is for solar capacity to grow by 9.4%.
The number of installed systems in the previous year has a modest expected effect of
increasing capacity by half a percent for each additional system. A county with twenty
new systems installed in the current year should expect new capacity to increase by
10% the next year, holding all else constant.
Residential PV demand is fairly inelastic to differences in the number of owner-
occupied housing units, population density, and median home values. A one percent
increase in the number of owner-occupied homes is expected to increase residential
capacity by about one percent. PV demand is even less elastic when it comes to
population density. A one percent increase in the population density is expected to
decrease capacity by only .65%, while a one percent increase the county median home
value is expected to increase capacity by 1.12%.
Next, table 16. presents the marginal effects of pro-environmental preference in-
dicators. The marginal effects are again evaluated at the sample means.
Table 16. Marginal effects: environmental preferences
Unit change (1) (2) (3) (4)
in βˆ ∂E[lnYˆ ]/∂X ∂E[lnYˆ |Y > 0]/∂X ∂P (Yˆ > 0)/∂X
Hybrid vehicle sales (%) 0.332∗∗ 0.290∗∗ 0.223∗∗ 0.0323∗∗
(2.98) (2.98) (2.98) (2.92)
Democrats (%) 0.0207∗∗ 0.0181∗∗ 0.0139∗∗ 0.00201∗∗
(2.09) (2.08) (2.08) (2.09)
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Hybrid vehicles sales are found to be positively related with residential PV adop-
tion. An increase from 2% to 3% of hybrid vehicle sales is associated with a roughly
30% increase in residential capacity. Political party affiliation has a statistically signif-
icant effect, but small in magnitude. If voting rates for the democratic party increase
from 52% to 53%, residential capacity is expected to increase by about 2%.
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9.1 Policy impacts
Table 17. presents the per-unit change effects of SREC prices and sales tax exemp-
tions. Sample means were not used as evaluation points because the averages are
skewed due to an absence of these incentives from several states. Wherever the incen-
tive is not available these variables take on a value of zero, causing sample means to
be far from representative of real world values. Instead, the effects are evaluated at
three representative points of each variable. SREC prices are evaluated at the mean
of observed positive values ($280), and one standard deviation away in each direction
($95, $465). Sales tax exemptions are evaluated at 6% and 8%, which are the sales
tax rates in Vermont and New York, respectively.
Table 17. Marginal effects: SREC prices and sales taxes
Unit change (1) (2) (3) (4)
in βˆ ∂E[Y ]/∂X ∂E[Y |Y > 0]/∂X ∂P (Y > 0)/∂X
SREC Price ($)
at $95 .00176∗∗ 0.00130∗∗ 0.00115∗∗ 0.000125∗∗
(2.04) (2.03) (2.03) (2.01)
at $280 .00176∗∗ 0.00134∗∗ 0.00120+ 0.000119∗∗
(2.04) (1.97) (1.96) (2.13)
at $465 .00176∗∗ 0.00138+ 0.00124+ 0.000112∗∗
(2.04) (1.92) (1.90) (2.26)
Sales tax exemption (%)
at 6% 0.412∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗
(6.81) (5.98) (5.98) (7.57)
at 8% 0.412∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗
(6.81) (5.83) (5.69) (13.35)
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The SREC price effect is significant, although the coefficient is not large. The
small effect may be due to the significant variability in SREC prices since the open-
ing of SREC markets. A one hundred dollar increase from $95 is estimated to give a
13% boost to residential PV adoption. Negative shifts in SREC markets can likewise
negatively impact demand. These results support anecdotal evidence from Pennsylva-
nia that plummeting SREC prices slackened demand for new PV installations. Large
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drop-offs in the SREC incentive may cause homeowners to question the reliability of
these markets for providing a production incentive throughout the lifespan of the PV
system. Future solar carve-out policies may need to consider price support mecha-
nisms to avoid price shocks and mitigate uncertainty about SREC markets. Where
a sales tax exemption is available, an increase in the sales tax rate from 6% to 7%
is expected to increase residential PV adoption by roughly 35%. States with higher
sales taxes will see somewhat greater gains to adoption as a result of the sales tax
exemption policy.
Next, table 18. presents the marginal effects due to the availability of policies
represented with binary (dummy) variables. Coefficient estimates are interpreted as
proportional changes in residential PV capacity due to a discrete change from zero
(no policy) to one (policy exists).
Table 18. Marginal effects: dummy policy variables
Discrete change (1) (2) (3) (4)
from 0 to 1 β ∂E[Y ]/∂X ∂E[Y |Y > 0]/∂X ∂P (Y > 0)/∂X
Rebate (d) 1.351∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(6.37) (6.51) (6.58) (5.85)
Income tax credit (d) -0.555+ -0.401+ -0.357+ -0.0387+
(-1.68) (-1.70) (-1.69) (-1.70)
Loan program (d) 1.785∗∗∗ 1.369∗∗∗ 1.228∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(4.77) (4.69) (4.61) (4.95)
Solar rights (d) 0.0809 0.0595 0.0527 0.00572
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Income tax credit effects have an unexpected sign and are weakly significant. Solar
rights regulations are found to have no measurable effect on residential PV demand.
Loan programs have the largest impact on residential PV capacity. Availability of
a low-interest solar loan is expected to increase capacity by 137%, holding all else
constant. Rebates also have a strong positive effect, with availability of a rebate
expected to increase capacity by roughly 100%.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
This paper examines whether state policy incentives for residential solar PV instal-
lations are effective drivers of adoption. It is possible that solar adoption may be
driven only by financial considerations and pro-environmental preferences. In that
case, solar policies are inefficient because adopters would have adopted solar PV ab-
sent policy incentives. Previous literature has not explored state policy effects on
demand for solar PV.
The empirical results show that policy incentives are effective at increasing solar
PV capacity at the county level. Sales tax exemptions, income tax credits, loan
financing programs, cash rebates, and solar-specific energy production mandates are
key drivers of growth in residential solar technology adoption. In addition, this study
provides empirical evidence that a technology-neutral RPS policy alone does not drive
solar PV adoption. The results suggest that for solar capacity to grow, solar-specific
technology standards should be included in future RPS policies.
Contrary to previous empirical findings by Zahran et al. (2008) and Kwan (2012),
the results of this paper provide little evidence that demographic characteristics such
as age and education level are significantly related to solar PV adoption. Controlling
for demographic and income differences, political party affiliation as well as the share
of hybrid vehicle ownership within a county are found to have a positive effect on
solar adoption. This result indicates the importance of environmental preference as
a predictor of solar PV demand. The policies discussed in this paper are certain to
have welfare consequences. While this paper do not consider the efficiency of solar
PV policies, the magnitude of policy impacts estimated in this study could be used as
an input to future studies examining the welfare consequences of solar PV incentives.
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APPENDIX A
PROPERTIES OF CONDITIONAL EXPECTATIONS
Property 1. Conditional Jensen’s inequality: If g : R 7→ R is a convex function defined
on R and E[|Y |] < inf, then
g[E(Y |X)] ≤ E[g(Y )|x] (.1)
Property 2. If the random variable u, with conditional distribution function F , is
independent of the random variable X, then
P [u ≤ g(X)|X] = F [g(x)] (.2)
for any function g(X) of X (.3)
Property 3. (Cameron and Trivedi (2010), page 566). If the random variable u is
distributed such that u ∼ N (0, 1), with density φ(u) = (1/√2pi)exp(−c2/2)
and cumulative distribution function Φ(c), then for any constant c
E[u|u > c] =
∫ ∞
c
u
( φ(u)
1− Φ(c)
)
du (.4)
=
∫ ∞
c
u(φ(u))du
/
[1− Φ(c)]
=
∫ ∞
c
u(1/
√
2pi)exp(−c2/2)du
/
[1− Φ(c)]
=
∫ ∞
c
∂
∂u
(− (1/√2pi)exp(−c2/2))du/[1− Φ(c)]
=
[− (1/√2pi)exp(−c2/2)]∞
c
/
[1− Φ(c)]
=
[ φ(c)
1− Φ(c)
]
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APPENDIX B
STATE INCENTIVES FOR SOLAR ENERGY8
The following section provides descriptions of commonly used state RE policies that
aim to promote in-state solar PV adoption This list provides a snapshot of policies
that have been widely implemented; it is by no means exhaustive of RE policies.
Net Metering
Net metering policies allow unused RE generated electricity to be fed into the electric-
ity grid. This policy essentially enables a solar energy producer, be it a household or
a business, to run the electric meter in both directions. Unused electricity is fed into
the grid and counted as credit toward the monthly electricity bill. Forty states and
the District of Colombia have net metering policies for solar PV generated electricity.
Tax Incentives
Tax incentives reduce the high up-front costs of installing a solar PV array by reducing
tax liabilities. They come in the forms of tax credits, deductions, and exemptions
for corporate, personal, property and sales taxes. Several states use a combination of
the aforementioned mechanisms to maximize the tax incentives available for solar PV
energy. Around 20 states offer sales tax exemptions for the cost of solar equipment.
Thirty states and Puerto Rico offer some form of property tax exemption for buildings
with solar PV systems. Twenty states and the District of Colombia have implemented
investment tax credits for solar PV systems. Most credits apply to the installation
cost of the system. In some cases the credit is linked to the expected energy output
of the system. In Maryland, for example, homeowners receive $0.0085 per kWh of
8This section summarizes information available from the Database of State Incentives for Renew-
ables & Efficiency (DSIRE) www.dsireusa.org. All statistics and figures in this section are referenced
from DSIRE.
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energy produced for the first five years of service.
Grant Programs
Grants programs offer state government financing to specific RE projects in commer-
cial, industrial, utility, and government sectors. These funds are typically competitive
and can either be offered for a range of RE technologies or made specific to one form
of RE generation such as geothermal or solar PV. As well as financing the costs
of equipment and RE system installation, grants are also often applied to research
funding.
Rebate Programs
Rebate programs provide direct cash subsidies toward the up-front cost of a solar
PV system. At the state level these programs are more politically charged than tax
incentives as they require appropriation of state funds. In Massachusetts, the Com-
monwealth Solar II Program was alloted $4 million per year. Other rebate programs,
such as California’s Solar Initiative, have lump sum budgets with no time restriction.
Sixteen states and the district of Colombia currently have active state-wide rebate
programs. As with tax credits, rebate incentive amounts and eligibility requirements
vary widely among states. Maryland has a flat rebate of $1,000 for residential instal-
lations. In many states, incentives are awarded on a dollar per system kW capacity
schedule. Several states have tiered rebate schemes, under which incentive amounts
differ based on specific system attributes. For example, the Commonwealth Solar II
Program in Massachusetts has a moderate income adder which increases the rebate by
$0.40/W DC for eligible systems. In addition to state rebate programs, about 75 local
utilities around the country have made rebates available for solar PV installations.
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Renewable Portfolio Standards and Solar Carve-Outs
Renewable Portfolio Standards are a set of regulations that ultimately mandate that
a specific share of electricity sales must come from RE sources. Generally, utilities
comply with these mandates by investing in eligible RE generating capacity. In
some states compliance is ensured by establishing Alternative Compliance Payments,
usually in the form of a $/kW sum which utilities are obligated to pay if they fall
short of the mandated share of RE electricity sales. In many states, Renewable Energy
Credit (REC) markets are established alongside RPS. Utilities are then able to buy
and sell RECs as needed for compliance, all the while generating cost savings for RE
producers. RECs are generally awarded per kWh of RE electricity generated.
Since utility companies will always choose the least-cost option for compliance, in
most cases being large-scale wind projects, many state RPS policies include separate
standards for solar PV electricity sales. Separate standards for solar PV capacity
are often referred to as solar carve-outs or solar set-asides. Solar set-asides mandate
that a specific percentage of utility electricity sales must be generated by in-state
solar systems. Another less common policy is a credit multiplier, under which solar
produced energy counts as extra credit toward satisfying the RPS requirements. Of
the 29 states plus the District of Colombia with active RPS policies, 16 states and the
District of Colombia have included a solar carve-out. New Jersey currently has the
most aggressive support for solar energy with a carve-out of 4.1% of electricity sales
by 2028. An important facet of the solar carve-out mechanism is the development of
an in-state Solar Renewable Energy Credit (SREC) market to track and verify solar
energy production. SRECs are aggregated from individual homeowners by private
SREC aggregators, then bought by utilities for compliance. Each credit represents
one watt of energy produced from solar generation. In this way, SRECs function as
a rolling rebate for homeowners, based on the realized electricity production of their
systems.
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Feed-In Tariffs9,10
Feed-In Tariff (FIT) policies are a category of performance based incentives that
grant long-term payment contracts to RE producers. Unlike Renewable Portfolio
Standards, under which payments are subject to REC credit market conditions, FIT
payments are generally set at constant $/kW rates and above the market price of
electricity. FITs are common in Europe and are often attributed with the emergence
of robust wind and solar industries in countries like Germany and Spain. Specific
policy designs vary widely by eligible technologies, program ceilings, contract terms
and rates. Implementation and experience in the United States has been limited.
Seven states have mandated feed-in tariffs for RE generation. In the U.S., unlike
FIT designs commonly found in Europe, many local utilities voluntarily offer FIT
contracts to RE producers.
Loan Programs
State sponsored loan financing programs aim to reduce the up-front financial burden
of solar PV installations. These low interest loans help homeowners and businesses
spread the costs of a PV system over time, and provide favorable financing terms
in situations where private banking may fall short. Property Assessed Clean Energy
(PACE) financing is one version of a loan financing program. PACE financing is
administered by local governments and ties home improvement costs, i.e., the instal-
lation cost of a solar PV system, to the property. This mechanism enables long-term
fixed rates that are not affected by homeowners’ credit standing. Loan programs that
apply to solar energy are offered in about 30 states, with either state agencies or
utilities administering the funds. In some cases, state agencies and utilities partner
with private lenders to administer the program.
10U.S. Energy Information Administration; Today in Energy ; May 30, 2013
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APPENDIX C
STATE DUMMY VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES
This section presents the coefficient estimates for state dummy variables for each
estimator used in this paper. West Virginia is the excluded dummy, the effects of
which are subsumed by the constant. Table 19. presents the dummy variable results
for the pooled Tobit, random effects Tobit, instrumental variable Tobit and GLS
estimators. Table 20. presents the results of the state dummy variable estimates for
the first stage of the IV Tobit estimator, where the dependent variable is the SREC
price.
Table 19. State dummy variables results
Pooled Tobit RE Tobit IV Tobit GLS
State Robust SE Bootstrap SE Robust SE Robust SE
CT 10.67∗∗∗ 10.67∗∗∗ 10.73∗∗∗ 10.73∗∗∗ 11.41∗∗∗ 11.41∗∗∗ 3.097∗∗∗
(6.80) (6.52) (7.13) (5.77) (6.61) (7.98) (3.52)
DC 2.839∗∗ 2.839∗∗ 3.591∗∗ 3.591∗∗ 2.694∗∗ 2.694∗∗∗ -0.731
(2.69) (3.26) (2.64) (3.08) (2.38) (3.33) (-1.47)
DE 6.447∗∗∗ 6.447∗∗∗ 6.550∗∗∗ 6.550∗∗∗ 6.449∗∗∗ 6.449∗∗∗ 2.260∗∗∗
(7.09) (6.88) (6.49) (5.87) (6.50) (7.20) (4.65)
MA 6.272∗∗∗ 6.272∗∗∗ 6.361∗∗∗ 6.361∗∗∗ 6.802∗∗∗ 6.802∗∗∗ 1.466∗∗
(5.14) (4.59) (5.36) (3.75) (5.22) (5.53) (2.42)
MD 3.043∗∗ 3.043∗∗ 2.999∗∗ 2.999∗∗ 3.412∗∗ 3.412∗∗ -0.423
(3.11) (2.65) (3.16) (2.12) (3.23) (3.23) (-0.85)
ME 3.941∗∗ 3.941∗∗ 4.201∗∗ 4.201∗∗ 4.204∗∗ 4.204∗∗∗ -1.427+
(2.81) (2.77) (3.13) (2.61) (2.72) (3.35) (-1.93)
NH 2.772∗∗∗ 2.772∗∗∗ 3.172∗∗∗ 3.172∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗ 0.0586
(3.91) (3.72) (4.21) (3.80) (3.58) (3.52) (0.12)
NJ 6.895∗∗∗ 6.895∗∗∗ 6.716∗∗∗ 6.716∗∗∗ 7.446∗∗∗ 7.446∗∗∗ 2.244∗∗
(5.39) (4.38) (5.50) (4.45) (5.27) (5.34) (3.06)
NY 3.456∗∗∗ 3.456∗∗ 3.604∗∗∗ 3.604∗∗ 3.996∗∗∗ 3.996∗∗∗ 0.133
(3.43) (2.93) (3.74) (2.44) (3.72) (3.59) (0.23)
PA 1.168 1.168 1.332+ 1.332 1.236 1.236+ -0.474
(1.56) (1.50) (1.81) (1.44) (1.47) (1.76) (-1.40)
RI 1.892+ 1.892+ 1.957+ 1.957 2.828∗∗ 2.828∗∗ -1.844∗∗
(1.92) (1.71) (1.90) (1.19) (2.61) (2.67) (-3.27)
VT 2.267∗∗ 2.267∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗ 2.636∗∗∗ 2.636∗∗ 0.560
(3.24) (2.39) (3.53) (2.63) (3.71) (2.77) (1.09)
N 2014 2014 2014 2014 1911 1911 2014
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 20. First stage IV state dummy variable results
Dependent Variable IV Tobit
SREC Price ($) Robust SE
CT 13.60 13.60
(0.28) (0.22)
DC 102.8∗∗ 102.8∗∗∗
(2.82) (4.28)
DE 24.15 24.15
(0.80) (1.07)
MA -34.52 -34.52
(-0.93) (-1.15)
MD -36.01 -36.01∗∗
(-1.24) (-2.34)
ME 135.6∗∗ 135.6∗∗
(3.12) (2.75)
NH 36.62 36.62
(1.45) (1.15)
NJ 129.3∗∗∗ 129.3∗∗
(3.34) (2.70)
NY -66.25∗∗ -66.25
(-2.06) (-1.58)
PA -7.391 -7.391
(-0.34) (-0.35)
RI -83.31∗∗ -83.31+
(-2.65) (-1.91)
VT 12.70 12.70
(0.47) (0.33)
N 1911 1911
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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